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The United States Courts of Appeals for the Second and Ninth Circuits are
the nation’s premier appellate courts on copyright law.1 Leading copyright
casebooks include many decisions from these courts on topics like the originality
standard, works of authorship, exclusive rights, fair use, and ownership.2 For
example, the materials on copyright infringement typically cover the Second
Circuit’s abstractions test from Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp.3 and its bifurcated
approach to substantial similarity from Arnstein v. Porter.4 This coverage is
typically followed by a comparison with the extrinsic/intrinsic test the Ninth
Circuit used in Sid & Marty Krofft Television Productions, Inc. v. McDonald’s Corp.5
The Second and Ninth Circuits are the primary sources of much of our
nation’s copyright jurisprudence because of Hollywood and Broadway. The
states of California and New York are the principal places of business for much
of the entertainment, broadcasting, publishing, media, and technology
industries.6 With a combined population of almost 60 million people, they are
our first and fourth most populous states.7 They have high concentrations of
creative people in the arts, literature, music, and entertainment.8 Californians and
New Yorkers are longstanding influencers of social and cultural trends, and
readily shape public opinion.9
This Article, however, is not about the impact of the Second and Ninth
Circuits on copyright law. Rather, it discusses the importance of the copyright
law decisions from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit. This
Andrew Deutsch, Substantial Similarity in Copyright: It Matters Where You Sue, DLA PIPER (Dec.
22, 2020), https://www.dlapiper.com/en/germany/insights/publications/2020/12/iptnews-q4-2020/substantial-similarity-in-copyright/ (“The Second and Ninth Circuit Courts of
Appeals are inarguably the most important circuits for copyright law developments.”). Of
course, the United States Supreme Court has the last word.
2 See, e.g., JEANNE C. FROMER & CHRISTOPHER JON SPRIGMAN, COPYRIGHT LAW (1st ed. 2019);
CRAIG JOYCE ET AL., COPYRIGHT LAW (10th ed. 2016).
3 Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121-22 (2d Cir. 1930).
4 Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 468 (2d Cir. 1946).
5 Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods., Inc. v. McDonald’s Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1164 (9th
Cir. 1977). Compare JOYCE ET AL., supra note 2, at 664-82, with FROMER & SPRIGMAN, supra note
2, at 221-58.
6 See Andrew Deutsch, supra note 1 (stating that it “is not surprising [that they are the most
important circuits] since the industries that generate the most copyright disputes are located
in New York (publishing, media) and California (entertainment, software/gaming)”).
7 California is the most populous state with almost 40 million people, and New York comes
in fourth with nearly 20 million. US States - Ranked by Population 2021, WORLD POPULATION
REVIEW, https://worldpopulationreview.com/states (last visited Nov. 5, 2021).
8 See generally Zannie Giraud Voss, The Top 40 Most Arts-Vibrant Communities in America (2019),
SMU DATAARTS, https://culturaldata.org/pages/arts-vibrancy-index-2019/ (last visited Jan.
21, 2021).
9 Top Ten Most Important U.S. States, TOP TENS, https://www.thetoptens.com/most-importantus-states/ (last visited Jan. 27, 2021).
1
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circuit is important for many reasons, including South Beach, Peachtree Street,
Muscle Shoals, barbeque, and college football. The combined populations of
Alabama, Florida, and Georgia are over 36 million.10 These states are racially,
ethnically, and culturally diverse;11 and, the music, film, entertainment, media,
and technology industries in the region are booming.12 The musical heritage of
Georgia alone includes R.E.M., James Brown, Otis Redding, Little Richard,
Ludacris, and the Robert Shaw Chorale.13 Georgia has become “Hollywood
East,” where Deliverance, The Blind Side, and Black Panther were filmed along with
The Walking Dead, Stranger Things, and Ozark.14 Cox Media Group, CNN, TNT,
and Tyler Perry Studios are prominent media companies based in Atlanta.15 The
diverse creative culture in these states gives rise to copyright infringement
litigation in their federal courts. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh
Circuit reviews the decisions rendered by the federal district courts in these
states.16
The Eleventh Circuit turned 40 in 2021.17 This court has rendered many
influential copyright law decisions in the last four decades. This Article discusses
this court’s decisions in several areas. First, this Article reviews the originality
standard. Second, it explores the application of the U.S. Supreme Court’s Feist
QuickFacts,
U.S.
CENSUS
BUREAU,
https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/fact/table/FL,GA,AL/PST045219 (last visited Jan. 21,
2021).
11 Adam McCann, Most & Least Diverse States in America, WALLETHUB (Sept. 21, 2021),
https://wallethub.com/edu/most-least-diverse-states-in-america/38262.
12 See, e.g., Georgia Ranked No. 1 in Film Production by Business Facilities Magazine, GA. USA (July
20, 2020), https://www.georgia.org/newsroom/press-releases/georgia-ranked-no-1-filmproduction-business-facilities-magazine.
13 List of 163 Musicians – Georgia Music Hall of Fame Inductees, GEORGIA MUSIC HALL OF FAME
AND EDUCATION RESOURCES, https://gamusichall.com/inductee-list/ (last visited Jan. 21,
2021).
14 Georgia Filmography, EXPLORE GA., https://www.exploregeorgia.org/filmography (last
visited Oct. 15, 2021).
15 Olivia McClure, 24 Media Companies Making Atlanta the Epicenter of Entertainment, BUILT IN,
https://builtin.com/atlanta/media-companies-in-atlanta (last updated Sept. 30, 2021); Contact,
TYLER PERRY STUDIOS, https://tylerperrystudios.com/contact/ (last visited Oct. 15, 2021).
16 Our nation’s federal courts have exclusive subject matter jurisdiction over copyright
infringement claims. 18 U.S.C. § 1338(a). The three states in the Eleventh Circuit along with
Mississippi, Louisiana, and Texas, were originally part of the Fifth Circuit, but they split off to
form the Eleventh Circuit on October 1, 1981. Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals Reorganization
Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-452, 94 Stat. 1994. Fifth Circuit decisions from before the split
are considered binding precedent in the Eleventh Circuit. Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d
1206, 1207 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc) (holding that all decisions of the “old Fifth” Circuit
handed down prior to the close of business on September 30, 1981, are binding precedent in
the Eleventh Circuit).
17 See Bonner, 661 F.2d at 1207 (September 30, 1981 was the last day of business for the old
Fifth Circuit so the ‘new’ Eleventh Circuit turned 40 on October 1, 2021).
10
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decision to compilations, directories, computer software, architectural works,
and other creative works like movies, photographs, and characters. Third, this
Article analyzes copyright protection for unfixed works. Fourth, it examines the
scope of the government edicts doctrine. Fifth, this Article discusses the fair use
doctrine.
The Eleventh Circuit’s many decisions evidence a consistently rigorous
application of the originality standard, the principles announced in the Supreme
Court’s Feist decision, section 102(b) of the Copyright Act, scènes à faire, and the
merger doctrine. Thanks to this rigorous analysis, the court carefully separates
the copyrightable expression from the unprotected elements in works of
authorship. The court’s decisions also interpret and apply fair use generously in
the contexts of tensions between copyright and the First Amendment, parody,
and the use of protected works in education.
The Eleventh Circuit’s copyright jurisprudence adheres consistently to the
following fundamental principles. First, the circuit always applies the principle
that everyone is free to use whatever is in the public domain.18 Second, the circuit
abides by the principle that copyright protection only extends to creative
expression and not to ideas, facts, scènes à faire, and those elements of a work that
are standard, routine, commonplace, or dictated by efficiency.19 Third, the
Eleventh Circuit stands by the principle that rewarding to the author is a
secondary consideration because the primary beneficiary of copyright is the
public.20 Fourth, the circuit follows the principle that the use of a work and the
use of a copyright are distinct in that one may use a work’s unprotected elements
without infringing copyright.21 The Eleventh Circuit has thus protected the
public domain and everyone’s right to use the unprotected elements in a
copyrighted work of authorship over the last 40 years.
I.

THE ORIGINALITY STANDARD

Shortly before the creation of the Eleventh Circuit in 1981, the old Fifth
Circuit decided Miller v. Universal City Studios, Inc.22 This ruling remains important
See Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 231 (1964); Compco Corp. v. DayBrite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234, 237-238 (1964); David E. Shipley, Congressional Authority over
Intellectual Property Policy After Eldred v. Ashcroft: Deference, Empty Limitations, And Risks to the Public
Domain, 70 ALB. L. REV. 1255, 1256-57 (2007).
19 See Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 363 (1991); Bateman v.
Mnemonics, Inc., 79 F.3d 1532, 1542 (11th Cir. 1996).
20 See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984) (stating that
copyright law makes reward to the author a secondary consideration); Feist, 499 U.S. at 349
(“The primary objective of copyright is not to reward the labor of authors, but ‘[t]o promote
the Progress of Science and useful Arts.’” (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8)).
21 See Bateman, 79 F.3d at 1542 n.23 (citing L. Ray Patterson, Understanding Fair Use, 55 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 249, 259, 264 (1992)).
22 Miller v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 650 F.2d 1365 (5th Cir. 1981).
18
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precedent in the Eleventh Circuit,23 and the U.S. Supreme Court cited Miller in
its landmark Feist decision in 1991 for the proposition that the originality
requirement is the very “premise of copyright law.”24 The court of appeals also
rejected the sweat of the brow rationale for extending copyright protection to an
author’s research.25 The court said that protection for directories, compilations,
and other fact works is based on the originality of the compiler’s selection and
arrangement of factual material, and not on the compiler’s industriousness in
gathering the material.26 The U.S. Supreme Court’s influential Feist decision
reinforced the court of appeals’ explanations for not protecting research and
rejecting sweat of the brow.27
Gene Miller, a reporter for the Miami Herald, wrote a book about a young
woman abducted from an Atlanta motel and buried alive in a wood and fiberglass
capsule for 83 hours while her abductors sought a ransom. The victim
collaborated with Miller who spent more than 2500 hours investigating,
researching, interviewing, and writing the book. It was titled 83 Hours Till Dawn
and published in 1971. A producer for Universal read a condensed version of the
book in Reader’s Digest and thought it would make a good television movie. This
producer gave a copy of the book to a screenwriter. Universal negotiated with
Miller for movie rights, but the deal fell through. A screenwriter was then told to
write the screenplay without using the book. The resulting movie, The Longest
Night, was the Movie of the Week on ABC. Miller sued for copyright
infringement, and a jury awarded him $200,000.28
The major issue on appeal was whether the trial court erred by instructing the
jury that research was copyrightable.29 A critical sentence in the instruction
stated: “Moreover, if an author, in writing a book concerning factual matters,
engages in research on those matters, his research is copyrightable.”30 The
plaintiff testified about his extensive research. The plaintiff’s attorney’s opening
and closing statements touched on the plaintiff’s research and said it was
copyrightable. The trial court viewed “the labor and expense of the research
involved in the obtaining of those uncopyrightable facts as distinct from those
facts and more similar to the expression of the facts than to the facts

See supra text accompanying note 16.
Feist, 499 U.S. at 347 (quoting Miller, 650 F.2d at 1368).
25 Miller, 650 F.2d at 1372.
26 Id. at 1369. This rationale for protection was repeated by the U.S. Supreme Court a decade
later in Feist, 499 U.S. at 362-63.
27 Feist, 499 U.S. at 359-60.
28 Miller, 650 F.2d at 1367. For a complete version of the facts and the evidence presented at
trial, see Miller v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 460 F. Supp. 984 (S.D. Fla. 1978), rev’d 650 F.2d
1365 (5th Cir. 1981). See also David E. Shipley & Jeffrey S. Hay, Protecting Research: Copyright,
Common-Law Alternatives, and Federal Preemption, 63 N.C. L. REV. 125, 146-48 (1984).
29 Miller, 650 F.2d at 1367-68.
30 Id. at 1372.
23
24
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themselves.”31 The ‘research is copyrightable’ theory was central to the outcome
of the trial.32
The court of appeals stated that “[t]he issue is not whether granting copyright
protection to an author’s research would be desirable or beneficial, but whether
such protection is intended under the copyright law.”33 It rejected protecting
research because of the labor of the researcher/compiler. The court
acknowledged the difficulty of distinguishing other decisions about compilations
and directories that appeared to base protection on an industrious collection
rationale, but stated, “copyright in a directory . . . is properly viewed as resting
on the originality of the selection and arrangement of the factual material, rather
than on the industriousness of the efforts to develop the information.”34
The court of appeals noted that the Second Circuit had twice rejected the
argument that research was copyrightable.35 The court also said that copyright’s
distinction between protected expression and unprotectable facts balanced the
public’s interest in encouraging creative activity with the need for unrestrained
access to information. The court emphasized that this careful balance could not
be maintained if research was copyrightable.36 The court of appeals explained
that
[t]here is no rational basis for distinguishing between facts and
the research involved in obtaining facts. To hold that research
is copyrightable is no more or no less than to hold that the
facts discovered as a result of research are entitled to copyright
protection. . . . [T]he law is clear that facts are not entitled to
such protection. We conclude that the district court erred in
instructing the jury that research is copyrightable.37

Id. at 1369 (quoting Miller v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 460 F. Supp. 984, 987 (S.D. Fla.
1978), rev’d 650 F.2d 1365 (5th Cir. 1981)) (discussing the trial court’s order denying the
plaintiff’s motion for a new trial). The trial court believed that authors like the plaintiff would
not undertake the research required for a book like his account of the kidnapping only to have
a movie company be able to appropriate the fruits of that research so easily.
32 Miller, 650 F.2d at 1372.
33 Id. at 1369.
34 Id. See also Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 363-64 (1991) (using
similar language a decade later to explain how to reconcile copyright protection for
compilations with the principle that facts are not copyrightable).
35 Miller, 650 F.2d at 1370-72 (first citing Rosemont Enters., Inc. v. Random House, Inc., 366
F.2d 303 (2d Cir. 1966); and then citing Hoehling v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 618 F.2d 972
(2d Cir. 1980)).
36 Id. at 1371-72.
37 Id. at 1372.
31
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The U.S. Supreme Court cited the Miller decision in Feist38 and rejected the
industrious collection rationale for protecting compilations.39 The high court
followed the court of appeals in Miller in explaining that copyright protection
depended on a compiler’s creativity in selecting, coordinating, or arranging
unprotectable facts and data.40
The Eleventh Circuit’s 2020 decision in Vallejo v. Narcos Productions LLC
shows the vitality of the Miller decision after almost 40 years. The court held that
Netflix’s popular series, Narcos, did not infringe two chapters from Virginia
Vallejo’s memoir.41 The plaintiff’s book recounted her close relationship with the
drug trafficker Pablo Escobar.42 She alleged that episode 103 of Narcos infringed
material from her chapter titled “The Caress of a Revolver” and that episode 104
infringed material from her chapter titled “That Palace in Flames.”43 The
defendants admitted copying and argued that the only similarities between the
episodes and her chapters were unprotectable facts.44 The trial judge agreed and
granted summary judgment for the defendants because the scenes in Narcos did
not copy any protectable expression.45 The works were not substantially similar,
so there was no infringement as a matter of law.46
The Eleventh Circuit’s review was de novo, with the court having to decide
whether there was substantial similarity between the scenes in Narcos and
copyrightable elements in the two chapters from the plaintiff’s memoir.47 The
court noted that it had affirmed summary judgment in infringement cases where
it was clear that the moving party was entitled to judgment as a matter of law.48

Feist, 499 U.S. at 360 (quoting Miller, 650 F.2d at 1369-70).
Id. at 360-61.
40 Id. at 348.
41 Vallejo v. Narcos Prods. LLC, 833 F. App’x 250 (11th Cir. 2020) (per curiam); Lee S.
Brenner, Eleventh Circuit Says Netflix Series Does Not Infringe Copyrighted Memoir, VENABLE LLP
(Jan. 11, 2021), https://www.closeupsblog.com/2021/01/eleventh-circuit-says-netflix-seriesdoes-not-infringe-copyrighted-memoir/#page=1; Frank D’Angelo & Nathalie Russell, Vallejo
v. Narcos Productions LLC, LOEB & LOEB LLP (Oct. 27, 2020),
https://www.loeb.com/en/insights/publications/2020/11/vallejo-v-narcos-productions-llc.
42 Vallejo, 833 F. App’x at 252 (referencing a memoir titled Amando a Pablo, Odiando a Escobar
(Loving Pablo, Hating Escobar) that describes her affair with Escobar and the rise of the
Colombian drug cartels).
43 Id. at 254. “The Caress of a Revolver” describes an intimate encounter between the plaintiff
and Escobar in which he used a gun to caress her. Id. at 252-53. Episode 103 had a similar
sexual scene. Id. at 252. “That Palace in Flames” chapter involves a meeting between the
plaintiff, Escobar, and a leader from M-19, a Colombian guerrilla group. Id. Episode 104
portrays a similar meeting. Id.
44 Vallejo v. Narcos Prods. LLC, 415 F. Supp. 3d 1144, 1146, 1151 (S.D. Fla. 2019).
45 Id. at 1154.
46 Id. at 1152-54.
47 Vallejo v. Narcos Prods. LLC, 833 F. App’x 250, 256-57 (11th Cir. 2020) (per curiam).
48 Id. at 256.
38
39
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Since the defendant admitted copying, the appellate court, like the trial court, had
to determine if the appropriation of material from the memoir was actionable.49
The Miller decision was relevant to the court’s analysis and its comparison of
the respective scenes in the Narcos episodes and the chapters in the memoir. Ms.
Vallejo acknowledged that “the facts reported in her memoir are true.”50 Since
facts do not enjoy copyright protection, the plaintiff’s copyright covered “the
way that she set her ‘characters, theme, plot, setting, and mood and pace.’”51 The
court affirmed because the challenged scenes in Narcos copied only unprotected
facts, and were not substantially similar to the copyrightable aspects of the
plaintiff’s memoir.52 The court’s opinion includes thorough analyses and
comparisons of the two chapters from the plaintiff’s memoir and the two
episodes from Narcos.53
Vallejo also argued unsuccessfully that the trial court erred by failing to
distinguish between historical and non-historical facts in determining the scope
of copyright protection for her memoir. The plaintiff contended that nonhistorical facts are personal and protectable by copyright.54 According to the
court, this distinction was not legally sound.55 The court noted that the Supreme
Court had stated in Feist that “facts–scientific, historical, biographical, and news
of the day” do not receive copyright protection.56 Like its decision against
extending copyright protection to research in Miller, the Eleventh Circuit
declined to distinguish between historical and non-historical facts for purposes
of copyright protection.57 The scope of copyright for fact works like historical
accounts, biographies, news reports, and memoirs is very thin in the Eleventh
Circuit due to Miller v. Universal City Studios, Inc. and Vallejo v. Narcos Productions
LLC as reinforced by the Supreme Court’s Feist decision.
II. THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT’S RIGOROUS APPLICATION OF FEIST
The Supreme Court focused on the copyrightability of a telephone company’s
standard white pages directory in Feist.58 Justice O’Connor explained why the
directory did not meet the constitutional and statutory requirements for
protection. She defined an original work of authorship as one that is
Id. at 256-57.
Id. at 257 (quoting Miller v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 650 F.2d 1365 (5th Cir. 1981)).
51 Id. at 258.
52 Id. at 259-60.
53 Vallejo, 833 F. App’x at 258-60.
54 Id. at 260.
55 Id. at 260-61.
56 Id. (quoting Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 347-48 (1991)).
57 Id. at 260-61. The court also declined to apply a modified substantial similarity test for
comparing works in different media such as plaintiff’s book and defendant’s film.
58 Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 356-59 (1991) (explaining that the
plaintiff’s directory had been copied by the publisher of an area-wide directory).
49
50
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independently created, and that evidences at least a minimal level of creativity.59
Most works can satisfy this standard because they will possess some creative
spark.60 The Court defined creativity in Feist by negative example, describing how
an author’s preparation of a compilation like a directory or a catalog might not
satisfy the creativity requirement: selections and arrangements that are
mechanical, routine, commonplace, typical, garden variety, obvious, inevitable,
or dictated by law will often fail to pass muster.61 The Court also rejected the
industrious collection rationale for protecting compilations, directories, and
other low authorship works.62
In view of the U.S. Supreme Court’s approval and citation of Miller v. Universal
City Studios, Inc. in Feist, it is not surprising that the Eleventh Circuit has been
rigorous, and at times aggressive,63 in its subsequent application of Feist’s
principles to directories, computer software, architecture, and other works of
creative authorship. The court has acknowledged that a typical yellow pages
directory, or a software program for providing insurance premium quotes, or
plans for a four-bedroom residence are entitled to copyright protection. At the
same time, the court has consistently and carefully parsed these works to
eliminate unprotectable elements like ideas, facts, and scènes à faire. Due to such
parsing, the scope of copyright protection for these works is often very thin in
the Eleventh Circuit. This rigorous dissection of works of authorship protects
the public domain and everyone’s right to use the unprotected elements in those
works.
A.

COMPILATIONS – DIRECTORIES, CATALOGS, AND OTHER LOW
AUTHORSHIP WORKS

The Eleventh Circuit’s very careful approach to identifying the copyrightable
elements in a work of authorship took root in BellSouth Advertising & Publishing
Corp. v. Donnelley Information Publishing Inc.64 This litigation started in the late 1980s
before the Supreme Court issued the Feist decision.65 The parties stipulated that
BellSouth’s yellow pages directory, considered as a whole, qualified for copyright
protection. The defendant had not copied the text or the graphics of BellSouth’s
ads; it had not used BellSouth’s typeface; and, it had not photocopied or
Id. at 345 (stating that “a slight amount [of creativity] will suffice”).
Id.
61 See Howard B. Abrams, Originality and Creativity in Copyright Law, 55 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.
3, 16 (1992). See also David E. Shipley, Thin But Not Anorexic: Copyright Protection for Compilations
and Other Fact Works, 15 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 91, 92-93 (2007).
62 Feist, 499 U.S. at 359-61. The industrious collection rationale is also called the sweat of the
brow rationale for protection. Id. at 352.
63 JOYCE ET AL., supra note 2, at 247 n.7.
64 Bellsouth Advert. & Publ’g Corp. v. Donnelley Info. Publ’g, Inc., 999 F.2d 1436 (11th Cir.
1993).
65 See generally Shipley, Thin But Not Anorexic, supra note 61, at 101-03.
59
60
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reproduced the page-by-page arrangement or appearance of the directory.66
Rather, defendant Donnelley stipulated that it obtained from each listing in
BellSouth’s directory the telephone number, name, address, kind of business, and
unit of advertising for the subscriber. Donnelley’s copying was established by its
inclusion of erroneous listings taken from BellSouth’s competing directory.67
Donnelley took a free ride on BellSouth’s industrious collection of a substantial
amount of the information that went into the yellow pages. The fundamental
issue was whether the defendant had copied protectable expression.68
According to the district court, which granted summary judgment, Donnelley
infringed BellSouth.69 The Eleventh Circuit initially affirmed,70 saying that
copyright protection “extends to the selection, coordination and arrangement
which comprises an original format of the compilation work,” and that “there
must be a substantial appropriation of the original format of the compilation to
constitute the copying of protected material.”71 The court determined that
BellSouth had performed several acts of selection in creating its yellow pages by
coordinating all the informational components into complete business listings,
and then arranging these listings in an original format.72 It stated that the lower
court was correct in concluding that defendant had “expropriated the essence of
[BellSouth’s] compilation.”73
The Supreme Court decided Feist shortly after this ruling, and then
BellSouth’s victory was subsequently vacated by a grant of a rehearing en banc.74
Judge Stanley Birch, writing for the court, stated, “we are called upon to apply
Feist Publications . . . which addressed copyright protection for a ‘white pages’
telephone directory, to resolve the infringement claims presented to us
concerning a directory of a different color.”75
The court concluded that BellSouth’s decisions about what to include in the
yellow pages, such as determining the directory’s geographic scope, setting the
closing date for changes, and its marketing techniques to generate the data, did

Bellsouth, 999 F.2d at 1438 & 1445.
Id. at 1439.
68 Id. at 1438.
69 Bellsouth Advert. & Publ’g Corp. v. Donnelley Info. Publ’g, Inc., 719 F. Supp. 1551 at 1563
& 1569 (S.D. Fla. 1988).
70 Bellsouth, 999 F.2d at 952-53, aff’g 719 F. Supp. 1551 (S.D. Fla. 1988), vacated and reh’g en banc
granted by 999 F.2d 1435 (11th Cir. 1993).
71 Id. at 957.
72 Id. at 957-58 (citing Bellsouth, 719 F. Supp. at 1557-58).
73 Id. at 959.
74 Bellsouth, 999 F.2d at 1436 (11th Cir. 1992).
75 Bellsouth, 999 F.2d at 1438 (holding written by Judge Birch and joined by Judges Tjoflat, Fay,
Edmondson, Black and Carnes, whereas Judge Hatchett dissented, and Judges Kravitch,
Anderson, Cox and Dubina abstained from the decision).
66
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not meet the required level of originality. Rather, they were techniques for the
discovery of facts, not acts of authorship.76
Any useful collection of facts, however, will be structured by a
number of decisions regarding the optimal manner in which to
collect the pertinent data in the most efficient and accurate
manner. If this were sufficient, then the protection of
copyright would extend to census data, cited in Feist as the
paradigmatic example of a work that lacks the requisite
originality.77
The court next concluded that BellSouth’s coordination and arrangement of
the yellow pages was not copyrightable.78 Although these pages required
“somewhat more organization and arrangement than the white pages,” this was
not enough. BellSouth “did not deviate from the arrangement of the typical
business directory, which employs an alphabetical list of headings to describe the
various types of business and then alphabetizes the listings under the appropriate
headings.”79
Although it was conceivable that there could be other ways to arrange the
yellow pages, the plaintiff’s copyright in its arrangement failed due to the merger
principle.80 The merger of idea and expression prevents copyright protection for
otherwise original expression if there are only a few ways to communicate the
underlying idea.81 According to the court, it was irrelevant that there could have
been “some imaginable, although manifestly less useful, method of arranging
business telephone listings” because the relevant issue was whether BellSouth’s
arrangement demonstrated originality.82 Here again, the plaintiff failed to show
originality because its arrangement was typical – widely used in the industry.83
The contents of yellow pages vary from town to town, but the basic arrangement
stays the same.
Similarly, the court decided that BellSouth’s heading structure was not
protectable because many headings were obvious such as Attorneys, Banks, and
Brake Services.84 For the same reason, protection could not extend to
arrangements like dividing churches by denomination, attorneys by specialty, and
doctors by practice areas. In addition, some headings were not just standard but
Id. at 1441.
Id. (citing Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 347-48 (1991)).
78 Id. at 1442.
79 Id.
80 Id.
81 See Morrissey v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 379 F.2d 675, 678-79 (1st Cir. 1967).
82 Bellsouth, 999 F.2d at 1442-43.
83 Id.
84 Id. at 1444.
76
77
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also recommendations from the National Yellow Pages Association.85 Finally,
subscribers could select the heading under which their information would appear
from several options which meant that much of BellSouth’s heading structure
was not original.86
In short, the substantial similarity between BellSouth’s and Donnelley’s
directories was due to the use of common facts, typical unprotected
arrangements, and the alphabetization of listings under standard and unprotected
classifications.87 Donnelley “did not . . . appropriate whatever original elements might
arguably inhere in the” BellSouth directory.88 The Eleventh Circuit reversed the
trial court’s grant of summary judgment and entered judgment for Donnelley.89
Copyright protection for BellSouth’s directory as a whole extended only to
prevent wholesale reproduction.90
Copyright protection did not extend to the facts (names, addresses, and
phone numbers) in the white pages or to alphabetizing subscribers’ names with
their telephone numbers, according to the Feist decision. The Eleventh Circuit in
BellSouth extended Feist’s principles to a yellow pages directory which is a more
complex work of authorship than the white pages. The court precluded copyright
protection for BellSouth’s approach to selecting the facts and data about the
customers and businesses it listed, its typical arrangement of that information, its
standard heading structure, and its alphabetization of the facts and data about
those businesses and customers.91
The Eleventh Circuit applied Feist rigorously again in Warren Publishing, Inc. v.
Microdos Data Corp.92 The defendant’s Cable Access software package allegedly
infringed substantial sections of Warren’s Television & Cable Factbook.93 The
appropriated sections comprised 1,340 pages of data on 8,413 cable systems.94
The lower court granted summary judgment for Warren, ruling that its principal
community system for presenting the information was copyrightable,95 but the
Eleventh Circuit vacated and remanded while expanding on what it said in
BellSouth about satisfying the originality standard.96
Id.
Id. at 1442.
87 BellSouth Advert. & Publ’g Corp. v. Donnelley Info. Publ’g, Inc., 999 F.2d 1436, 1442,
1444-45 (11th Cir. 1993).
88 Id. at 1445 (emphasis added).
89 Id. at 1446.
90 Id. at 1438.
91 In contrast, the Second Circuit upheld the copyright on a classified business directory for
New York City’s Chinese American community in Key Publications, Inc. v. Chinatown Today
Publishing Enterprises, Inc., 945 F.2d 509 (2d Cir. 1991).
92 Warren Publ’g, Inc. v. Microdos Data Corp., 115 F.3d 1509 (11th Cir. 1997).
93 Id. at 1513.
94 Id. at 1511.
95 Id. at 1513-14.
96 Id.
85
86

Published by Digital Commons @ University of Georgia School of Law, 2021

13

Journal of Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 29, Iss. 1 [2021], Art. 3

80

J. INTELL. PROP. L.

[Vol. 29:1

The defendant did not deny that the plaintiff’s Factbook, considered as a
whole, was entitled to copyright protection as a compilation. Instead, it
challenged the lower court’s finding that Warren’s system for selecting the
communities for listing data was sufficiently creative to be copyrightable.97 The
Factbook’s information included the name, address, and telephone number of
each cable system operator; the number of its subscribers; the channels it offered;
the price of the service; and the type of equipment it used. The arrangement of
the entries was listed state-by-state in alphabetical order, and the communities
with cable service in each state were listed in alphabetical order.98
The information for each system, however, was not under the name of every
community it served because many cities and towns were in multi-community
systems. Repeating all the data under each community would have been
duplicative and added to the publication’s bulk. Instead, the plaintiff determined
that one community would be the principal one served by a particular company,
and all of the data about that company was listed under that community. There
were cross-references to that principal community in the entries for the other
cities and towns served by that cable operator.99 The district court said this
system for the selecting communities was original in the industry and a
copyrightable part of the compilation’s format. “[T]he selection of those
communities was creative and protectable because Warren uses a unique system
in selecting the communities that will be represented in the Factbook.”100
The Eleventh Circuit held that this conclusion was in error because section
102(b) of the Copyright Act excludes protection for ideas, processes, procedures,
and systems regardless of how they are expressed.101 The court said that “[i]f
Warren actually does employ a system to select the communities to be
represented in the book, then section 102(b) . . . bars the protection of such a
system.”102 It did not matter that defendant Microdos used that system.103
Moreover, even if Warren’s selection of communities was not based on a system,
the company’s decisions about which communities to include still would not be
copyrightable because there was nothing to show that Warren exercised any
judgment or creativity in determining which cable systems to include.104 The
court said that the plaintiff

Id. at 1516 n.18.
Id. at 1512-13.
99 Id. at 1516. The court used the Georgia section of the book as an example. Atlanta was
designated the principal community for an operator and then other cities served by that
operator in the region were cross referenced such as Alpharetta, Avondale Estates, Clarkston
and so on. Id. at 1512 n.3.
100 Id. at 1516 (quoting the district court ruling).
101 Id. at 1517 (citing 17 U.S.C. § 102(b)).
102 Id. at 1517.
103 Id. at 1517 n.21.
104 Id. at 1518.
97
98
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included the entire relevant universe known to it. The only decision
that it made was that it would not list separately information
for each community that was part of a multi-community cable
system; in other words, it decided to make the Factbook
commercially useful. Therefore, it cannot prevail in its claim
that it “selected” which communities to include in its
Factbook.105
By including all communities, Warren did not satisfy the modicum of
creativity required for a protectable selection of information. The court also said
that the idea of organizing by the principal community could be expressed in
only a few ways, so Warren’s organization of the cable system data merged with
the underlying idea of cross-referencing.106 The “people for whom [the directory
is] produced are not interested in having information repeated under every
community served by a multiple-community system.”107 Finally, even if Warren’s
selection of principal communities was creative and copyrightable, its claim for
protection still failed because it did not make the actual selections. The record
showed that the cable operators themselves determined, in the case of multicommunity systems, the city or town under which the facts for their entire system
would be listed.108
The Eleventh Circuit severely limited copyright protection for BellSouth’s
yellow pages and Warren’s directory of cable systems, but it upheld an
infringement verdict for a detailed multiple listings service for yachts in BUC
International Corp. v. International Yacht Council Ltd.109 The plaintiff’s service
(BUCNET) was a centralized directory of yacht listings enabling yacht brokers
to access a wealth of information about vessels.110 BUCNET utilized a standard
form and format that brokers used to submit information regarding the yachts.111
The plaintiff selected and arranged the format’s section headings that appeared
on a computer screen, and the headings included categories like accommodations
and layout, overview, vessel walkthrough, galley/laundry, electronics and
navigation, hull, construction, sails and rigging, and several other
classifications.112 The defendants set up a competing computerized listing service
that replicated 4,400 listings from BUCNET.113 The plaintiff’s claim concerned
the defendants’ appropriation of their categories and headings–their template–
Warren, 115 F.3d at 1518 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
Id. at 1518 n.27.
107 Id. at 1518 n.27.
108 Id. at 1519-20.
109 BUC Int’l Corp. v. Int’l Yacht Council Ltd., 489 F.3d 1129 (11th Cir. 2007).
110 Id. at 1134.
111 Id.
112 Id. at 1134-35.
113 Id. at 1137.
105
106
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and not the use of the information entered by brokers on that template.114 The
trial court denied the defendants’ motions for judgment as a matter of law, and
the jury returned a verdict for BUCNET with an award of damages.115
The defendants’ appeal echoed language from BellSouth and Warren regarding
the originality of the plaintiff’s listing service.116 They asserted that the yacht
brokers were the real authors of the selection and arrangement, that the merger
doctrine precluded protection for the selection of the section headings, and that
the overall selection and arrangement lacked creativity.117 The Eleventh Circuit
responded that in only two percent of the plaintiff’s 4,667 listings had the brokers
modified the plaintiff’s format, so there was no merit to the defendants’
contention that the brokers were the real authors of the compilation.118 The
defendants’ merger argument failed because the court said there were many ways
to select and organize information about yachts in a listing service.119 Testimony
about how the plaintiff selected and structured the categories also evidenced
sufficient creativity to warrant the trial court’s denial of the defendants’ motion
for judgment as a matter of law.120
The defendants also argued that the jury should have been instructed that
works like directories needed to be ‘virtually identical’ in order to find
infringement and that the trial court erred in its substantial similarity
instruction.121 The Eleventh Circuit found no error. It said that the substantial
similarity standard applied to the alleged infringement of factual compilations.122
The court recognized that “it is the original selection and arrangement of the
collected data that bears legal significance for factual compilations”123 and
concluded that the plaintiff presented the jury with substantial claims for
infringement of the selection, order, and arrangement of the compilation, in
particular the categories and section headings.124

See Shipley, Thin But Not Anorexic, supra note 61, at 123 n.257.
BUC Int’l, 489 F.3d at 1138. About 65 percent of defendants’ listings were from the
BUCNET listings.
116 See supra text accompanying notes 75–108.
117 BUC Int’l, 489 F.3d at 1142.
118 Id.
119 Id. at 1144 (stating the defendants defined the idea too narrowly, and the general idea about
presenting information about boats to brokers could be expressed in a variety of ways. The
defendants could use terms like hull, galley, sails, and rigging, but not in the same manner as
the plaintiff). Id. at 1141-42.
120 Id. at 1145.
121 Id. The jury was told that it could find infringement if there were substantial similarities
between the original elements of BUC’s compilation and the corresponding elements of the
defendants’ compilation.
122 BUC Int’l, 489 F.3d at 1149.
123 Id. at 1148 (citing Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 348 (1991)).
124 Id. at 1148-49 (stating that there was no error in the instruction).
114
115
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The clear message from these decisions is that the Eleventh Circuit requires
a strict application of Feist’s principles to compilations like directories, catalogs,
and other low authorship works. By carefully scrutinizing works to make sure
that copyright does not extend to facts, ideas, and other unprotectable elements,
the Eleventh Circuit, as in its Miller v. Universal City Studios, Inc. ruling as reinforced
by Feist, is demanding proof of authorship in the compiler’s selection,
coordination, or arrangement of facts, ideas, and information. What is standard,
routine, obvious, or customary does not pass muster, and the court is not
reluctant to turn to § 102(b) and the merger doctrine to limit protection. Here
again, the court is protecting the public domain and everyone’s right to use those
elements in a work of authorship that are not protected by copyright.
B. SOFTWARE INFRINGEMENT AND FEIST

The Eleventh Circuit’s software infringement decisions exhibit the same
rigorous analysis of copyrightability and the scope of protection as seen in the
court’s compilation and directory decisions. In Bateman v. Mnemonics, Inc.,125 the
court adopted the Second Circuit’s influential “abstractions-filtrationcomparison” test for the substantial similarity analysis from Computer Associates
International, Inc. v. Altai, Inc.126 This rigorous test, driven in large part by Feist,127
is summarized by the Second Circuit as follows:
In ascertaining substantial similarity under this approach, a
court would first break down the allegedly infringed program
into its constituent structural parts. Then, by examining each
of these parts for such things as incorporated ideas, expression
that is necessarily incidental to those ideas, and elements that
are taken from the public domain, a court would then be able
to sift out all non-protectable material. Left with a kernel, or
possible kernels, of creative expression after following this
process of elimination, the court’s last step would be to
compare this material with the structure of an allegedly
infringing program. The result of this comparison will
determine whether the protectable elements of the programs

Bateman v. Mnemonics, Inc., 79 F.3d 1532, 1532 (11th Cir. 1996).
Comput. Assocs. Int’l v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693 (2d Cir. 1992). The U.S. District Court
for the Middle District of Georgia adopted the Altai test in CMAX/Cleveland, Inc. v. UCR, Inc.,
804 F. Supp. 337, 354 (M.D. Ga. 1992). The court found infringement in what was a “clear
case of software cloning.” Mark L. Gordon, Copying to Compete: The Tension Between Copyright
Protection and Antitrust Policy in Recent Non-Literal Computer Program Copyright Infringement Cases, 15
J. COMPUT. & INFO. L. 171, 186-87 (1996).
127 Altai, 982 F.2d at 711-12.
125
126
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at issue are substantially similar so as to warrant a finding of
infringement.128
The Second Circuit announced and applied this test in a case involving the
defendant’s non-literal copying of the plaintiff’s program.129 The Eleventh
Circuit extended this test to literal or verbatim copying in Bateman when it held
that a trial court’s jury instruction, limiting the Altai test to non-literal elements,
was misleading.130 The court emphasized the importance of distinguishing
between protectable expression and unprotectable methods of operation in a
computer program, and the need to exclude those unprotectable methods and
processes from the scope of copyright.131 The plaintiff has to show that the
defendant actually used protectable original elements from its work.132
According to the Eleventh Circuit, the filtration analysis in the Altai test “should
eliminate from comparison the unprotectable elements of ideas, processes, facts,
public domain information, merger material, scenes a faire material, and other
unprotectable elements . . . .”133
The challenged instruction, limiting the Altai test to non-literal copying, was
seen as a manifest distortion and misstatement of the law because “the jury must
have concluded that any instances of literal copying of Bateman’s code . . . were
by definition acts of copyright infringement.”134 The jury should have considered
challenges to the originality of those portions of the plaintiff’s code that were
actually copied.135 After all, copying unprotected elements from a work is not
infringement.136 “In other words, the fact-finder should be required, even in a
literal copying case, to consider the defendant’s challenges to the scope of
plaintiff’s copyright . . . .”137
The Bateman decision has been criticized because extending Altai “outside the
non-literal arena further demonstrates the erosion of copyright protection
available for computer software.”138 It is doubtful that this critique troubles the
Eleventh Circuit. The court also stated that

Id. at 706.
Id. at 721.
130 Bateman, 79 F.3d at 1546.
131 Id. at 1541 n.21.
132 Id. at 1541.
133 Id. at 1545 (quoting Gates Rubber Co. v. Bando Chem. Indus., Ltd., 9 F.3d 823, 834 (10th
Cir. 1993)).
134 Id.
135 Id.
136 Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 351 (1991). See also L. Ray Patterson,
Understanding Fair Use, 55 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 249, 259, 264 (1992) (distinguishing
between using the work and using the copyright).
137 Gordon, supra note 126, at 185.
138 Gordon, supra note 126, at 185.
128
129
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[e]ven if the Altai test is limited to nonliteral copying, however,
a parallel type of analysis must be undertaken in examining
alleged instances of literal copying of computer code or screen
displays. Whether one chooses to call the consideration of such
generally recognized challenges to literal code copying as
merger and efficiency “filtration” is of little consequence; what
matters is that these well-established “defenses” are
considered.139
In short, even if the plaintiff proves that there was verbatim copying of its
code in the Eleventh Circuit, the defendant will not be liable if it can show that
the code it copied is not copyrightable.
Another Eleventh Circuit software infringement decision from 1996 that
applied the Altai test thoroughly is MiTek Holdings, Inc. v. Arce Engineering Co.140
The trial court used Altai’s abstractions and filtration steps to determine that only
five protectable elements remained in the plaintiff’s program.141 Even though
four elements in the defendant’s program were substantially similar, the court
denied the plaintiff’s motion for a preliminary injunction.142 It determined that
the copying of these elements was too insignificant in the context of the
plaintiff’s overall program to constitute infringement.143 The Eleventh Circuit
affirmed, agreeing that the defendant’s copying of these protected elements was
de minimis and not actionable.144 The court stated that “[t]he burden is on the
copyright owner to demonstrate the significance of the copied features, and, in
this case, MiTek has failed to meet that burden.”145 This statement underscores
the court’s demanding application of Altai and the principles announced in Feist
to restrict the scope of copyright protection for software.146

Bateman v. Mnemonics, Inc., 79 F.3d 1532, 1545 (11th Cir. 1996) (footnote omitted).
MiTek Holdings, Inc. v. Arce Eng’g Co., 89 F.3d 1548 (11th Cir. 1996).
141 Id. at 1559.
142 Id. at 1550, 1559.
143 MiTek Holdings, Inc. v. Arce Eng’g Co., 864 F. Supp. 1568, 1584 (S.D. Fla. 1994).
144 MiTek Holdings, Inc. v. Arce Eng’g Co., 89 F.3d 1548, 1560 (11th Cir. 1996).
145 Id.
146 Gordon, supra note 126, at 184-186. Notwithstanding the Eleventh Circuit’s strict
application of the Altai test and the principles from Feist, it is possible for the owner of
copyright in a computer program to win an infringement claim in the Circuit. For example,
the plaintiff can win if the alleged infringer is unable to meet its burden of demonstrating lack
of originality or to show that the plaintiff’s work is unworthy of copyright protection. See, e.g.,
Montgomery v. Noga, 168 F.3d 1282, 1289-90 (11th Cir. 1999) (upholding jury verdict of
copyright infringement against the defendant’s arguments that the plaintiff’s copyright was
invalid); Cable/Home Commc’n Corp. v. Network Prods., Inc., 902 F.2d 829, 851-54 (11th
Cir. 1990)(holding that defendants’ infringement of plaintiffs’ encryption software that gave
139
140
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The Eleventh Circuit discussed the Bateman and MiTek decisions in 2020 in
Compulife Software, Inc. v. Newman, and clarified the allocation of the burden of
proof in software infringement litigation.147 Both parties provided insurance
premium quotes electronically. Compulife alleged that the defendant obtained its
copyrighted code by misrepresentation and that it had a hacker ‘scrape’
protectable data from its server.148 The parties consented to a bench trial before
a magistrate judge who determined that the copyright in Compulife’s HTML
code was valid but that it had failed to prove its infringement claim.149
The Eleventh Circuit said that since the defendant’s copying of Compulife’s
program was established, the question was whether the copied elements were
“protected expression and of such importance to the copied work that the
appropriation is actionable.”150 This statement is consistent with the court’s
earlier statement in MiTek regarding de minimis copying.151 The court added that
“[i]n most cases, a ‘substantial similarity’ between the allegedly offending
program and the protectable, original elements of the copyrighted work
establishes actionable copying.”152 It said this analysis is both qualitative and
quantitative, and is undertaken only after the unprotectable parts of the plaintiff’s
work are set aside in the Altai test’s filtration step.153 Here again, the court
repeated principles it announced in Bateman and MiTek.154 Copying unprotected
elements in a program is not actionable.
However, the court found several errors in how the magistrate judge applied
the Altai test. That judge said the plaintiff had the burden to prove that the
elements of the code copied by the defendant were protectable. This ruling was
an error. The Eleventh Circuit stated
[a]lthough we haven’t previously done so, we now clarify that
after an infringement plaintiff has demonstrated that he holds
a valid copyright and that the defendant engaged in factual
non-subscribers access to plaintiffs’ works was willful, direct, and contributory infringement
and not a fair use).
147 Compulife Software Inc. v. Newman, 959 F.3d 1288 (11th Cir. 2020).
148 Id. Compulife also asserted a trade secret claim under Florida law. Valerie Sanders, Defendant
Must Prove That Copied Portion of Copyrighted Work Is Unprotectable, EVERSHEDS SUTHERLAND
(May 29, 2020), https://www.11thcircuitbusinessblog.com/2020/05/defendant-must-provethat-copied-portion-of-copyrighted-work-is-unprotectable/.
149 Compulife, 959 F.3d at 1288. The magistrate judge also held that Compulife failed to prove
its trade secret claim.
150 Id at 1302.
151 See supra text and notes accompanying notes 140–46.
152 Compulife, 959 F.3d at 1302 (quoting Bateman v. Mnemonics, Inc., 79 F.3d 1532, 1542 (11th
Cir. 1996)).
153 Id. at 1302-03.
154 See supra text and notes accompanying notes 129–46 (discussing the Bateman and MiTek
decisions from 1996).
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copying, the defendant bears the burden of proving–as part of
the filtration analysis–that the elements he copied from the
copyrighted work are unprotectable.155
This clarifying statement is consistent with the Bateman decision, and the
importance of considering the defendant’s arguments that the portions of the
code it copied are unprotectable due to merger, scenes a faire, the application of
section 102(b) of the Copyright Act, or other well-established defenses.156 In
other words, once the plaintiff has shown copying, the burden shifts to the
defendant to demonstrate that the work it copied is unprotectable or otherwise
unworthy of copyright protection.157
In addition, the court in Compuserve ruled that the magistrate judge erred by
analyzing ‘substantiality’ by reference to the infringing work, rather than by
reference to the copyrighted work. “The law is clear that both the quantity of the
appropriation and the qualitative importance of the appropriated portion are
properly judged by their significance to the copyrighted work, not their
significance to the allegedly infringing work.”158 This statement is consistent with
the court’s earlier statement in MiTek that the plaintiff has the burden of showing
that the protectable portions of code copied by a defendant had more than de
minimis significance.159
In summary, the Eleventh Circuit, like most circuits, utilizes the ‘abstractionsfiltration-comparison’ test announced by the Second Circuit in Altai to analyze
software infringement claims.160 The Eleventh Circuit extended this test to
instances of literal copying as well as non-literal copying.161 This application of
the test means that even if the plaintiff shows verbatim copying of elements of
its software, the defendant can try to show that those copied elements are not
copyrightable.162 In addition, the burden is on the plaintiff to show the
significance of the copied elements. De minimis copying is not actionable.163

Compulife, 959 F.3d at 1305 (emphasis in original).
See supra text and notes accompanying notes 129–39 (discussing how the court applied these
limitations on the scope of copyright protection in Bateman).
157 Bateman, 79 F.3d at 1541.
158 Compulife, 959 F.3d at 1308. In addition, the court said that the magistrate judge failed to
state sufficient findings and conclusions to permit meaningful review. Id. at 1308-09.
159 See supra text and notes accompanying notes 140–46 (discussing the MiTek decision and the
court’s requirement that the plaintiff/copyright owner show that the defendant had copied
more than a de minimis amount of protected expression).
160 Bateman, 79 F.3d at 1544; JOYCE ET AL., supra note 2, at 712 n.8 (stating that the Third
Circuit still clings to Whelan).
161 Bateman, 79 F.3d at 1545; JOYCE ET AL., supra note 2, at 713 n.10.
162 Bateman, 79 F.3d at 1545.
163 MiTek Holdings, Inc. v. Arce Eng’g Co., 89 F.3d 1548, 1560 (11th Cir. 1996).
155
156
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However, the alleged infringer bears the burden of showing that the elements it
copied are not protectable or are otherwise unworthy of copyright protection.164
C. FEIST AND THE SCOPE OF COPYRIGHT PROTECTION FOR ARCHITECTURAL
WORKS

Congress enacted the Architectural Works Copyright Protection Act
(AWCPA) in 1990 which changed the copyright status of architecture in the
United States.165 This legislation established architectural works as a new
category of protectable subject matter in section 102(a)(8) of the Copyright Act.
It defined an architectural work as “the design of a building, as embodied in any
tangible medium of expression, including a building, architectural plans, or
drawings. The work includes the overall form as well as the arrangement and composition of
spaces and elements in the design, but does not include individual standard features.”166 The
legislative history explains that the phrase “arrangement and composition of
spaces and elements in the design” recognizes that creativity often includes an
architect’s “selection, coordination, or arrangement of unprotectible elements
into an original, protectable whole” and the incorporation of “new, protectable
design elements into otherwise standard, unprotectable building features.”167
This language about architects selecting, coordinating, and arranging
elements is similar to the Copyright Act’s definition of a compilation as “a work
formed by the collection and assembling of preexisting materials or of data that
are selected, coordinated, or arranged in such a way that the resulting work as a

Compulife, 959 F.3d at 1303. See also Google LLC v. Oracle Am., Inc., 141 S. Ct. 1183, 1197200 (2021) (explaining that the Court assumed for argument’s sake that the Sun Java API fell
within the definition of that which can be copyrighted, and then acknowledged, in discussing
the importance of fair use, that the scope of protection for software and other functional
works was thin); SCOTUS Rules in Favor of Google in Landmark Copyright Case, COOLEY LLP
(Apr. 8, 2021), https://www.cooley.com/news/insight/2021/2021-04-08-scotus-rules-infavor-of-google-in-landmark-copyright-case.
165 Architectural Works Copyright Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5089, 5133
(1990); David E. Shipley, The Architectural Works Copyright Protection Act at Twenty: Has Full
Protection Made a Difference?, 18 J. Intell. Prop. Law 1, 3 (2010) (stating that The Copyright Act
of 1909 did not include architectural works such as plans, blueprints, and models as
copyrightable subject matter, and the 1976 Act did not mention architectural works either).
See generally Marshall A. Leaffer, UNDERSTANDING COPYRIGHT LAW 134 (6th ed. 2014); David
E. Shipley, Copyright Protection for Architectural Works, 37 S.C. L. Rev. 393, 395 (1986). Congress
recognized that expanding protection for architecture would “stimulate excellence in design,
thereby enriching our public environment in keeping with the constitutional goal.” H.R. REP.
NO. 101-735, at 13 (1990).
166 17 U.S.C. § 101 (emphasis added).
167 H.R. REP. NO. 101-735, at 18 (1990); see also 17 U.S.C. § 101 (interior design/architecture
can be protected as well).
164
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whole constitutes an original work of authorship.”168 The Supreme Court in Feist
described the scope of protection for compilations as thin,169 and there have
been many decisions applying the AWCPA showing that copyright protection
for architectural works is often limited.170 This lean copyright means that the
architect/plaintiff ordinarily will have to prove close to verbatim copying of
protected expression in order to win.171 An architect’s thin copyright is due to
several factors. These factors include the functionality of most buildings; the lack
of protection for individual standard features as specified in the statute;
application of the idea/expression dichotomy; the impact of the scenes a faire
doctrine; and treating an architect’s arrangement and composition of design
features like a compilation.172 This rigorous application of the AWCPA resulting
in thin protection for architectural works is especially clear in several Eleventh
Circuit decisions.
Intervest Construction, Inc. v. Canterbuy Estate Homes, Inc. involved litigation over
floor plans for homes with four bedrooms.173 The plaintiff’s architectural work
was copyrightable, but the trial court said that given the dissimilarities with
respect to the coordination of non-original, commonplace, and elementary
components, no reasonable observer could conclude that the works were
substantially similar.174 The court of appeals upheld summary judgment for the
defendant.175 It said that the requisite creativity for copyrightable architecture
was analogous to that required for a compilation; the architect’s selection,
coordination, or arrangement of standard features may together constitute a
protectable whole.176 Although the plaintiff’s work satisfied this low threshold,
the court said there was no infringement because the parties coordinated the
unprotectable components differently.177 It also noted that when the scope of
copyright protection is thin, the substantial similarity inquiry is narrow.178 In
essence, the offending work had to be virtually identical to the plaintiff’s work

17 U.S.C. § 101. See also 17 U.S.C. § 103(b) (explaining that a compilation’s copyright is
limited to only the material contributed by the author, as opposed to the preexisting material
used in the work).
169 Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 349 (1991).
170 Shipley, The Architectural Works Copyright Protection Act at Twenty: Has Full Protection Made a
Difference?, supra note 165, at 22-23, 60.
171 See, e.g., Intervest Constr., Inc. v. Canterbury Est. Homes, Inc., 554 F.3d 914, 917-919 (11th
Cir. 2008).
172 Shipley, The Architectural Works Copyright Protection Act at Twenty: Has Full Protection Made a
Difference?, supra note 165, at 7.
173 Intervest, 554 F.3d at 921.
174 Id. at 918-19.
175 Id. at 921.
176 Id. at 919.
177 Id. at 921.
178 Id. at 919, 921.
168
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to infringe.179 Moreover, the court expressed a preference for summary judgment
in cases involving protected and unprotected elements because a judge
understands the dichotomy between ideas and expression and appreciates that
not all copying is infringement.180
Oravec v. Sunny Isles Luxury Ventures concerned plans for a high-rise
condominium complex allegedly infringed by the Trump Palace and the Trump
Royale.181 The defendant contended the plaintiff’s plans were too conceptual to
be copyrighted because they had commonly-used features and lacked floor plans,
site plan dimensions, and any other indicators of site support.182
The trial court disagreed, saying that there was not a constructability test, that
the plaintiff’s use of convex and concave segments was distinctive in relation to
other aspects of the design, and that the arrangement and use of elevator towers
were original and concrete.183 Still, even though the plaintiff’s plans were
copyrightable, the court granted summary judgment for the defendants because
no reasonable jury could find their buildings substantially similar to the
plaintiff’s.184
The Eleventh Circuit affirmed.185 The plaintiff listed ten elements present in
the respective designs of the parties’ buildings:
(1) alternating concave and convex sections; (2) three
prominent elevator shafts that protrude above the roof of the
building; (3) rounded building ends; (4) constant radius curves;
(5) holes in the building; (6) a twin tower design; (7) seethrough floor plans; (8) a circular plaza; (9) a central fountain;
and (10) a rooftop pool and landscape elements.186

See also Howard v. Sterchi, 974 F.2d 1272, 1276 (11th Cir. 1992) (the parties’ floor plans
were visually similar, and the layouts were generally the same, but dissimilarities were
significant such as roof lines, windows, and dimensions – the court noted that there were a
limited number of ways to divide a rectangle and stated that modest dissimilarities are more
significant than they may be in other types of works).
180 Intervest, 554 F.3d at 920. See also Home Design Servs., Inc. v. Turner Heritage Homes, Inc.,
825 F.3d 1314, 1326 (11th Cir. 2016) (finding judgment as a matter of law for the defendant
because the parties’ four-three split style house plans were different in dimensions, wall
placement, and presence, arrangement, and function of particular features).
181 Oravec v. Sunny Isles Luxury Ventures L.C., 469 F. Supp. 2d 1148, 1159 (S.D. Fla. 2006),
aff’d, 527 F.3d 1218 (11th Cir. 2008).
182 Id. at 1162.
183 Id. at 1165-66.
184 Id. at 1172.
185 Oravec v. Sunny Isles Luxury Ventures L.C., 527 F.3d 1218 (11th Cir. 2008) (footnote
omitted).
186 Id. at 1225-26.
179
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The appellate court acknowledged that the defendants’ buildings had
alternating concave and convex sections and three partially exposed elevator
towers extending above their rooflines.187 However, it provided a list of
dissimilarities that were evident from comparing the designs.188
For example, the dimensions and shapes of the floor plans were different.
The designs of the elevator towers were also significantly different, with the
towers on the Trump buildings being sloped to give the effect of smokestacks
on a cruise ship while the plaintiff’s towers were horizontal.189 The plaintiff
identified other elements of similarity but the court held that these elements were
unprotected ideas or individual standard features that had been expressed
differently by the defendants.190
The court also emphasized that it was necessary to be mindful of the principle
codified in section 102(b) that copyright does not extend to ideas, but to
expression.191 The court also noted that the AWCPA excluded individual
standard features from protection, such as commonly used doors, windows, and
other staples.192
At the same time, the court said that creativity in architecture often involves
the “selection, coordination, or arrangement of unprotect[ed] elements”193 in a
protectable whole, and that the statute itself defines an architectural work as “the
arrangement and composition of spaces and elements in the design.”194
Nevertheless, protecting the use of concave and convex forms or the use of three
elevator towers “would extend the protections of copyright law well beyond their
proper scope.”195
Affording protection to the plaintiff’s selection of design elements “would
effectively bar all other architects from incorporating those concepts into new

Id. at 1226.
Id. at 1226-27.
189 Id. at 1226-27.
190 Id. at 1227.
191 Oravec v. Sunny Isles Luxury Ventures L.C., 527 F.3d 1218, 1224-25 (11th Cir. 2008) (citing
17 U.S.C. § 102(b), which provides that “[i]n no case does copyright protection for an original
work of authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation,
concept, principle, or discovery . . . .”).
192 Id. at 1225 (referencing 17 U.S.C. § 101, which provides that “[a]n architectural work . . .
does not include individual standard features”); see also H.R. REP. NO. 101-735 (1990), reprinted
in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6935, 6949 (noting that “the definition [of architectural work] makes
clear that protection does not extend to individual standard features, such as common
windows, doors, and other staple building components”).
193 Id. (citing H.R. REP. NO. 101-735 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6949).
194 Oravec, 527 F.3d 1225 (quoting the definition of “architectural work” in 17 U.S.C. § 101).
195 Id. at 1227.
187
188
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and original designs.”196 This broad swath would diminish the number of ideas
and concepts available for future works.197
Modest differences are significant when comparing architectural works in the
Eleventh because there are often only a few ways to arrange standard
architectural features. Having a commodious living space in the middle of a
home is an idea, as is the concept of a four-three split plan. Ideas are not
copyrightable, and modest differences are more significant with architectural
works than with other works of authorship in the Eleventh Circuit.198 It is
challenging for architects to win infringement suits in this circuit because of its
demanding application of the principles announced in Feist to separate
protectable expression from unprotectable elements in an architectural work.
This close scrutiny leads to very thin copyright protection for architectural works
in the Eleventh Circuit.199
D. APPLYING FEIST PRINCIPLES TO OTHER WORKS OF AUTHORSHIP

The Eleventh Circuit’s careful parsing of works of authorship to separate
copyrightable expression from unprotectable components is evident in Beal v.
Paramount Pictures Corp.200 This 1994 decision held that the movie “Coming to
America” did not infringe the copyright in the novel The Arab Heart.201 The court
first summarized the respective works, and noted that another court held
defendant Paramount liable to the author/humorist Art Buchwald for using his

Id. at 1228.
Id. See also Corwin v. Walt Disney Co., 468 F.3d 1329, 1343-45 (11th Cir. 2006) vacated and
superseded by, 475 F.3d 1239 (11th Cir. 2007) (affirming summary judgment for defendant,
Disney, because the alleged similarities between the plaintiff’s concepts and designs for a
theme park and Disney’s EPCOT were unprotectable and not so striking as to establish
copying and thus overcome Disney’s evidence of its independent creation of EPCOT).
198 See, e.g., Home Design Servs., Inc. v. Turner Heritage Homes, Inc., 825 F.3d 1314, 1320
(11th Cir. 2016); Arthur Rutenberg Homes, Inc. v. Jewel Homes, LLC, 655 F. App’x 807, 81112 (11th Cir. 2016); Intervest Constr., Inc. v. Canterbury Est. Homes, Inc., 554 F.3d 914, 921
(11th Cir. 2008).
199 See Medallion Homes Gulf Coast, Inc. v. Tivoli Homes of Sarasota, Inc., 656 F. App’x 450,
455 (11th Cir. 2016) (affirming summary judgment for alleged infringer because no reasonable
finder of fact could find the works substantially similar); Dream Custom Homes, Inc. v.
Modern Day Constr., Inc., 476 F. App’x 190, 192 (11th Cir. 2012) (affirming summary
judgment for the alleged infringer after the court separated what was protected from what was
unprotectable in the respective works); Miller’s Ale House, Inc. v. Boynton Carolina Ale
House, LLC, 702 F.3d 1312, 1326-27 (11th Cir. 2012) (noting that a chain restaurant’s features
of a rectangular bar, booth seating, and high top tables were standard and unprotectable ideas).
200 20 F.3d 454 (11th Cir. 2012).
201 Id. at 456, aff’g 806 F. Supp. 963 (N.D. Ga. 1992) (granting summary judgment for the
defendants).
196
197
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idea as the basis for the movie.202 The appellate court said that the trial court had
granted summary judgment on “two grounds: that any similarity between The
Arab Heart and ‘Coming to America’ concerned only noncopyrightable elements
of the book, and that no reasonable jury, properly instructed, would find the two
works to be substantially similar.”203
“Paramount conced[ed] access for purposes of the summary judgment,” so
the appellate court focused on substantial similarity of protected expression.204
It agreed that the few broad similarities between the works “involve[d] ideas and
other general themes that are not susceptible to copyright protection.”205 Those
themes were wealthy young princes coming to America to meet the women they
would marry and strong rulers who wanted arranged marriages for their princes.
The court said these themes were “in the realm of ideas” unprotected by
copyright.206
The court next explained that respective works “diverge[d] sharply from
those broad similarities.”207 Nevertheless, it carefully analyzed the “plot, mood,
characterization, pace, and setting” of the works and concluded that “no
reasonable factfinder could conclude that ‘Coming to America’ is substantially
similar to the copyrightable elements of The Arab Heart.”208 “If the similarities in
general ideas and scènes à faire serve to show anything at all, perhaps it is only that
‘in Hollywood, as in [life] generally, there is only rarely anything new under the
sun.’”209
There was a similar parsing of a work’s copyrightable expression from its
unprotectable components in litigation over the photograph of the Bird Girl
statue that appeared on the book cover of the novel, Midnight in the Garden of Good
and Evil.210 The plaintiff, Jack Leigh, was commissioned by Random House to

Id. at 458 (discussing Paramount’s litigation with Buchwald v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 13
U.S.P.Q.2d 1497 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1990). The court explained that while Paramount and the
other defendants may have appropriated Buchwald’s idea, that would not preclude the copying
of the plaintiff’s copyrightable expression from The Arab Heart).
203 Beal, 20 F.3d at 458.
204 Id. at 460.
205 Id.
206 Id.
207 Id. at 460.
202

Id. at 460-64. The district court had engaged in a similar thorough analysis of the respective
works.
209 Id. (citing Berkic v. Crichton, 761 F.2d 1289, 1294 (9th Cir. 1985) and Ecclesiastes 1:9); see
also Herzog v. Castle Rock Ent., 193 F.3d 1241 (11th Cir. 1999) (the plaintiff was unable to
establish that the producers of the movie “Lone Star” had access to her screenplay
“Concealed”, and the court also determined, after a thorough analysis, that the few similarities
between the works involved noncopyrightable elements).
210 Leigh v. Warner Bros., Inc., 212 F.3d 1210, 1212 (11th Cir. 2000).
208
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take the photo, but he retained ownership and registered his copyright.211
Defendant Warner Brothers took photographs and film footage of a replica of
the Bird Girl statue to promote its movie version of the novel. Three segments
of film footage and six still images allegedly infringed Leigh’s copyright.212 The
district court granted summary judgment for Warner Brothers, and Leigh
appealed.213
The Eleventh Circuit stated:
Leigh’s copyright does not cover the appearance of the statue
itself or of the Bonaventure Cemetery, for Leigh has no rights
in the statue or its setting. Nor does the copyright protect the
association of the statue with the Midnight story. Leigh may
have been the first to think of the statue as evocative of the
novel’s mood and as an appropriate symbol of the book’s
themes, but copyright law protects only original expression,
not ideas.
Thus, the district court correctly identified the elements of
artistic craft protected by Leigh’s copyright as the selection of
lighting, shading, timing, angle, and film.214
Leigh also argued that his copyright extended to the overall mood conveyed
by his photograph, but the trial court said that the photo’s eerie and spiritual
mood was unprotectable scenes à faire.215 The Eleventh Circuit followed this by
explaining that “[a]nalyzing relatively amorphous characteristics of the picture as
a whole” risks extending copyright to a work’s unoriginal aspects.216 Instead, the
proper approach was to focus on the concrete elements of a photographer’s craft
because a photo’s mood is the effect created by lighting, shading, timing, angle,
and film, and not an independent aspect of the work.217
The appellate court ultimately concluded that the trial court was correct to
hold that the film sequences featuring the Bird Girl statue were not substantially
similar to Leigh’s photograph. However, the similarities between the defendant’s
still photographic images and Leigh’s photograph on the book’s cover were
significant enough to preclude summary judgment.218 The court carefully
compared of the defendant’s works with the copyrightable aspects of Leigh’s

Id. at 1213.
Id.
213 Id. at 1214.
214 Id. at 1214-15 (citations omitted).
215 Id. at 1215.
216 Leigh v. Warner Bros., Inc., 212 F.3d 1210, 1215 (11th Cir. 2000).
217 Id.
218 Id. at 1215-16.
211
212
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photograph to reach these conclusions.219 It emphasized that substantial
similarity is a question of fact and that “summary judgment is only appropriate
if no reasonable jury could differ in weighing the evidence.”220
The Eleventh Circuit exercised the same kind of thorough analysis in 2021
when it decided Dubay v. King.221 The plaintiff alleged that the character Roland
Deschain in Steven King’s The Dark Tower series infringed the copyright on the
comic book character Restin Dane from the plaintiff’s series, The Rook.222 The
court described the plaintiff’s Dane as battling a variety of villains during his
time-traveling adventures and as sharing
numerous attributes with other traditional heroes from comic
books. He is handsome, masculine, courageous, and
honorable. Dane is selfless and can always be counted on to
“do the right thing.” Dane does not engage in much
introspection; his character arc remains constant throughout
The Rook series. In short, Dane is a traditional comic book
hero.223
Stephen King regards The Dark Tower series as his ‘magnum opus.’
Throughout this series, Roland Deschain goes after a structure called the “Dark
Tower” as well as the “Man in Black.” He is a sorcerer who serves the “Crimson
King.”224 The Eleventh Circuit described Deschain as a complex character.
He is courageous and skilled with a gun, yet he lacks the
idealism and morality of the traditional hero. Deschain is a
loner who does not value the lives of others and is, thus, willing
to sacrifice those who get in his way. . . . Deschain’s character
arc throughout The Dark Tower series is marked by his search
for self-knowledge and redemption. . . . In short, Deschain is
best described as an anti-hero.225

Id.
Id. at 1216.
221 See Dubay v. King, 844 F. App’x 257 (11th Cir. 2021), cert. denied, 142 S. Ct. 490 (2021)(the
Eleventh Circuit’s ruling affirmed that King’s anti-hero, Roland Deschain, is not substantially
similar to DuBay’s comic book character Restin Dane from The Rook); see generally Wook
Hwang & Kyle Petersen, DuBay v. King, LOEB & LOEB LLP (Feb. 23, 2021),
https://www.loeb.com/en/insights/publications/2021/03/dubay-v-king.
222 Dubay, 844 F. App’x at 259.
223 Id. at 259-60.
224 Id. at 260 (adding that Marvel has published licensed graphic novels based on the series,
and Sony produced a movie adaptation of the series).
225 Id.
219
220
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King moved for summary judgment after discovery. The district court,
assuming that King had access to the plaintiff’s works,226 ruled for him and the
other defendants. The court concluded that the characters were not substantially
similar.227
DuBay asserted on appeal that a reasonable jury could find substantial
similarity based on a list of eight similarities between his Dane character and
King’s Deschain.228 The court’s review was de novo. It said that because “a work
may contain uncopyrightable elements,” the task of the reviewing court was to
determine “both whether the similarities between the works are substantial from
the point of view of the lay observer and whether those similarities involve
copyrightable material.”229 The court then narrowed the plaintiff’s list of alleged
similarities to a few copyrightable elements. It said that the characters’ names did
not merit protection, that many of the alleged similarities were scènes à faire too
general to be protected,230 and that the towers and tower imagery in the works
served different functions for each character.231 The court also said that “the
characters interact[ed] with bird companions and imagery in different ways,” and
that their “interactions with young male companions [were] dramatically
different.”232
The court recognized the pitfalls of analyzing similarities in isolation but
noted that taking a more holistic analysis of them, as urged by the plaintiff, hurt
his case by showing the “distinctiveness of each character.”233 It concluded by
stating that the characters were “surrounded by different stories and contexts,
thereby rendering any similarities superficial.”234 The district court did not err by
granting summary judgment in Stephen King’s favor.235

Id. at 264, 265 n.8.
Id. at 266.
228 Dubay, 844 F. App’x at 263-64. DuBay also challenged the trial court’s failure to exclude
reports and plot and character summaries by King’s experts.
229 Id. at 264-65.
230 Id. at 264-65. The alleged similarities that were scènes à faire included “their knightly heritage,
travel to different times and parallel worlds, Western attire, fictionalized Alamo histories, and
knife-wielding.” Id. See also Wook Hwang & Kyle Petersen, supra note 218.
231 Id. at 265.
232 Id.
233 Id. at 266.
234 Dubay, 844 F. App’x at 266. The U.S. Supreme Court denied Dubay’s petition for certiorari.
142 S. Ct. 490 (2021).
235 Id. The U.S. Supreme Court denied Dubay’s petition for certiorari. 142 S. Ct. 490 (2021).
The Supreme Court’s “refusal to hear Dubay reinforces the basic tenet of copyright law that
general ideas or scenes a faire cannot be protected by copyright.” See generally, Finnegan,
Henderson, Farabow, Garrett & Dunner, SCOTUS Shelves Request to Review 11th Circuit Dark
Tower
Decision,
Ending
Copyright
Saga
(December
20,
2021),
https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g. See also Tolbert v. Discovery, Inc., 2021 WL
226
227
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Beal v. Paramount, the Intervest Construction architectural plans ruling, Vallejo v.
Narcos Productions, and the Dubay opinion about Stephen King’s Roland Deschain
character, were cited by the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of
Georgia in 2021. This court granted a Rule 12(b)(6) motion dismissing a claim
that Netflix’s show Outer Banks infringed the novel Pennywise: The Hunt for
Blackbeard’s Treasure!236 The judge made a careful comparison of the two works
and focused on whether Outer Banks copied original elements of the novel.237 It
noted that courts within the Eleventh Circuit had examined substantial similarity
“at the motion-to-dismiss stage, reasoning that to do so is appropriate because
the analysis requires only an examination of the works in question.”238 It also
stated that not all copying is infringement, that generalized themes are not
protectable, and that scènes à faire were not protectable. “Once any generalized
ideas and scènes à faire are disregarded, the infringement analysis asks whether the
protected expression of ideas in the two works is substantially similar.”239
Next, the court focused on the most significant of the alleged similarities
between the works. The judge wrote that the plots of the novel and the film
differed significantly, noted that the protagonists in the works shared few
similarities, explained that copyright did not extend to setting the works on the
shores of North Carolina, and concluded that the mood and pace of the works
varied greatly.240 Ultimately, the court determined that “no reasonable lay
observer would recognize Outer Banks as being derivative of Wooten’s novel”
and dismissed the copyright infringement claim.241
3793045 (N.D. Ala. 2021) (HGTV’s Good Bones home renovation show did not infringe
plaintiff’s mother-daughter home renovation show following a thorough analysis of
characters, plot, pace, setting and other features–in granting a summary judgment the court
noted that the plaintiff failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to defendant’s
independent creation of Good Bones). Some cases do not require this kind of rigorous analysis
of what is and what is not copyrightable. See, e.g., Cable/Home Commc’n Corp. v. Network
Prods., Inc., 902 F.2d 829 (11th Cir. 1990) (the defendant was held liable for importing and
distributing pirated computer chips that enabled users to unscramble copyrighted
programming intended for paying subscribers of cable systems).
236 Wooten v. Netflix, Inc., No. 1:20-cv-05166-TCB, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 203672 (N.D.
Ga. May 25, 2021).
237 Id. at 6.
238 Id. at 7.
239 Id. at 10-11 (citing Vallejo v. Narcos Prods, 833 F. App’x at 257).
240 Id. at 12-20.
241 Id. at 23. See also Jackson v. JPay, Inc., 851 F. App’x 171 (11th Cir. 2021) (affirming dismissal
of copyright infringement claim because names are not copyrightable so the plaintiff could
not sue based on the use of his name). But see Nat'l Equestrian League v. White, 2021 BL
198488, S.D. Fla., 20-21746-CIV-MORENO/GOODMAN, 5/26/21. In this litigation, a
federal magistrate judge denied defendant’s Rule 12(b)(6) motion and allowed plaintiffs’
infringement claim to proceed stating that while “some elements may not be protected (like
the broad idea of a horse jumping competition), this Court should not undertake the factfocused process of determining the merits of Plaintiffs’ copyright claims on a motion to
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The Eleventh Circuit’s careful parsing of works to separate copyrightable
expression from unprotectable components is seen clearly in these several
rulings: that the movie “Coming to America” did not infringe the copyright in
the novel The Arab Heart; the court’s opinion regarding the alleged infringement
of the Bird Girl photograph from the book cover of the novel Midnight in the
Garden of Good and Evil; and, its holding that Steven King’s character Roland
Deschain from The Dark Tower series did not infringe the comic book character,
Restin Dane, from The Rook. The demanding application of principles of
copyrightability and the scope of protection in these opinions and other Eleventh
Circuit decisions is also evident in the opinion by the U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of Georgia in Wooten v. Nexflix, Inc. explaining why it was
granting the defendant’s Rule 12(b)(6) motion and dismissing the plaintiff’s
infringement claim. Whether the subject matter at issue is a directory, a
compilation, a taxonomy, computer software, an architectural work, a movie, a
photograph, a novel, or a character, the courts in the Eleventh Circuit take great
care to separate the protectable from the unprotectable in a plaintiff’s work to
decide whether there is substantial similarity of protected expression.
III. THE AVAILABILITY OF COPYRIGHT PROTECTION
In 1999 and 2018, the Eleventh Circuit decided influential cases dealing with
whether particular categories of works of authorship are entitled to any kind of
copyright protection whatsoever. The case of United States v. Moghadam focused
on Congress’ authority, under the Constitution’s Copyright Clause, to extend
copyright-like protection to unfixed works of authorship. The court said no, but
it upheld the challenged legislation based on the Commerce Clause.242 This ruling
has influenced other federal courts.243
The second decision, Code Revision Commission v. Public.Resource.Org, focused on
the government edicts doctrine. The Eleventh Circuit held that the annotations
and commentary in the Official Code of Georgia Annotated were not
copyrightable. It did this by expanding the venerable government edicts
doctrine.244 The United States Supreme Court affirmed 5-4, but the Court’s

dismiss.” This report was affirmed and adopted by Judge Moreno. 2021 WL 2414153 (S.D.
Fla. 6/14/2021).
242 United States v. Moghadam, 175 F.3d 1269 (11th Cir. 1999); JOYCE ET AL., supra note 2, at
71-72 n.15.
243 See infra text and notes accompanying notes 246–69.
244 Code Revision Comm’n v. Public.Resource.Org, Inc., 906 F.3d 1229 (11th Cir. 2018).
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majority did not rely on the three-factor test used by the Eleventh Circuit, and
the impact of this ruling is still playing out.245
A. ANTI-BOOTLEGGING LEGISLATION AND COPYRIGHT’S FIXATION
REQUIREMENT

There was no federal protection for a performing artist’s live performance
prior to 1994. Imagine Linda Ronstadt performing live at a small club. She sings
several copyrighted old standards, and one of her fans in the audience records
the performance without permission. That fan–the bootlegger-could sell the
recordings (audio and audio-visual) so long as they paid appropriate royalties to
the copyright owners of the songs Ronstadt performed. The fan did not need to
pay royalties to Ronstadt because her live performances of the songs were
unfixed and thus not copyrightable. In addition, the fan did not infringe the
copyright on Ronstadt’s recordings of those songs because the fan did not copy
those recording. Instead, the fan recorded her live performances of the songs.246
The lack of federal protection for live performances changed in 1994 when
Congress passed the Uruguay Round Agreements Act and implemented the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.247 Section 512 of the Act is an antibootlegging statute that bars the unauthorized audio and audio-visual recording
of live performances, the unauthorized reproduction of those recordings, and
their trafficking.248 This statute provides for penalties but does not have a
duration notwithstanding the “Limited Times” restriction in the Copyright
Clause.249 For the first time in United States copyright law, legislation provided
a remedy for the unauthorized copying of unfixed works; live performances that
had not been fixed in a tangible medium of expression. The Act subjected
violators to copyright-like liability.250 There were doubts about the
constitutionality of this legislation because it protected unfixed works
notwithstanding the Constitution’s ‘writings’ requirement.251
The Eleventh Circuit was the first appellate court to rule on the
constitutionality of this statute in United States v. Moghadam,252 and it upheld the
Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org, 140 S. Ct. 1498 (2020). See infra text and notes
accompanying notes 297–12(discussion of the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision and the impact
of that ruling).
246 Shipley, Congressional Authority Over Intellectual Property Policy, supra note 18, at 1268.
247 Leaffer, supra note 165, at 55-56.
248 Uruguay Round Agreements Act, 103 Pub. L. No. 465, 108 Stat. 4809, 4974 (1994).
249 See Leaffer, supra note 165, at 55-57 (thorough discussion of the anti-bootlegging statute
and how it is at odds with the ‘Limited Times’ requirement in the Copyright Clause as well as
the ‘writings’ requirement).
250 Leaffer, supra note 165, at 57.
251 Id. at 56-57; JOYCE ET AL., supra note 2, at 71-72.
252 United States v. Moghadam, 175 F.3d 1269 (11th Cir. 1999).
245
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legislation based on Congress’ authority under the Commerce Clause.253 The
defendant admitted distributing bootleg CDs of live performances by several
artists and moved to dismiss a criminal indictment because the statute did not
fall within Congress’ powers under the Copyright Clause.254 The government
argued in response that the statute was valid under the Commerce Clause. The
trial court denied the defendant’s motion, and the Eleventh Circuit affirmed
Moghadam’s conviction. The court said that the anti-bootlegging statute was a
hybrid that resembled copyright in some ways but was distinct in others.255
According to the court, the word ‘writings’ in the Copyright Clause seemed to
require some kind of fixation.256 However, it declined to decide whether that
clause could be interpreted expansively to include protection for live
performances that were capable of being reduced to tangible form.257 The court
assumed, without deciding, that the fixation requirement precluded Congress
from turning to the Copyright Clause as the source of its power to enact the antibootlegging statute.258 The court also noted that the statute did not have an
explicit time limitation but said the defendant failed to preserve the argument
that it violated the clause’s “Limited Times” provision.259
The court turned to the Commerce Clause even though the Clause had not
been cited by Congress in passing the anti-bootlegging legislation.260 According
to the Eleventh Circuit, the lack of a jurisdictional element was not fatal because
the link between the prohibited conduct of making and distributing bootleg CDs
and interstate and foreign commerce was clear.261
The court, however, said that “[t]he more difficult question . . . [was] whether
Congress can use its Commerce Clause power to avoid the limitations that might
prevent it from passing the same legislation under the Copyright Clause.”262 The
court discussed cases indicating that the Commerce Clause could be “used . . . to
accomplish something that the Copyright Clause might not allow,”263 and it
noted arguments from other cases that the clause’s limitations “can be said to
represent the Framers’ judgment that Congress should be affirmatively

Id. at 1274-75.
Id. at 1271.
255 Id. at 1271-72. For example, it was not clear whether fair use or the work for hire doctrine
applied to the statute.
256 Id. at 1273-74.
257 Id. at 1274.
258 Id. at 1274.
259 Id. at 1274 n.9, 1281 n.15.
260 Id. at 1275 n.10.
261 Id. at 1275-76.
262 Id. at 1277.
263 Id. at 1279.
253
254
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prohibited from passing certain types of legislation, no matter under which
provision.”264
Resolving this tension, we take as a given that there are some
circumstances . . . in which the Commerce Clause cannot be
used by Congress to eradicate a limitation placed upon
Congress in another grant of power. For the reasons that
follow, we hold that the instant case is not one such
circumstance. We hold that the Copyright Clause does not
envision that Congress is positively forbidden from extending
copyright-like protection under other constitutional clauses,
such as the Commerce Clause, to works of authorship that may
not meet the fixation requirement inherent in the term
“Writings.”265
The court also explained why extending copyright-like protection to live
performances was not inconsistent with the fixation requirement.266 In dicta,
however, the court said that the apparently perpetual protection provided by the
statute might be fundamentally inconsistent with the “Limited Times” restriction
in the Copyright Clause.267
Even though the Eleventh Circuit expressed reservations about how
Congress drafted the anti-bootlegging statute, other courts have followed its lead
to uphold the statute by turning to the Commerce Clause.268 The Eleventh
Circuit reached this conclusion well before those other courts.269
B. EXPANSION OF THE GOVERNMENT EDICTS DOCTRINE

The Eleventh Circuit’s decision in Code Revision Commission v.
Public.Resource.Org, Inc.270 had a significant impact on questions of copyrightability
and the scope of copyright protection. The court held in 2018 that all
annotations, commentary, and notes in the Official Code of Georgia Annotated
Id. at 1279.
Id. at 1280 (footnote omitted).
266 Id. at 1281.
267 Id. The court did not decide this issue because the criminal defendant had not raised it.
268 United States v. Martignon, 492 F.3d 140 (2d Cir. 2007); KISS Catalog v. Passport Int’l
Prods., 350 F. Supp. 2d 823 (C.D. Cal. 2004), on reconsideration, 405 F. Supp. 2d 1169 (C.D. Cal.
2005) (upholding the anti-bootlegging statute as constitutional).
269 See JOYCE ET AL., supra note 2, at 71 (discussing Eleventh Circuit’s Moghadam decision from
1999 and then the more recent Second Circuit decision in Martignon from 2007 in which that
appellate court determined that the anti-bootlegging statute was not a copyright law and
therefore could be upheld under the Commerce Clause, 492 F.3d at 151-53).
270 Code Revision Comm’n v. Public.Resource.Org, Inc., 906 F.3d 1229 (11th Cir. 2018).
264
265
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(O.C.G.A) were in the public domain and unprotectable.271 The United States
Supreme Court affirmed 5-4 in 2020, holding that the annotations in Georgia’s
official code were not subject to protection under the Copyright Act.272 The
Supreme Court rejected the three-factor test applied by the Eleventh Circuit, but
stated that
A careful examination of our government edicts doctrine
precedents reveals a straightforward rule based on the identity
of the author. Under the government edicts doctrine, judges–
and, we now confirm, legislators–may not be considered the
“authors” of the works they produce in the course of their
official duties as judges and legislators. The rule applies
regardless of whether a given material carries the force of law.
. . . [C]opyright does not vest in works that are (1) created by
judges and legislators (2) in the course of their judicial and
legislative duties.273
The Georgia legislature’s involvement in creating the Official Code of
Georgia Annotated started in 1977 when it concluded that the state’s laws needed
to be re-codified. It established the Code Revision Commission to perform
several tasks, including contracting with a publisher to revise the 1933 Code and
subsequently enacted laws.274 The Commission contracted with The Michie
Id. at 1232. See generally David E. Shipley, Code Revision Commission v.
Public.Resource.Org and the Fight over Copyright Protection for Annotations and Commentary, 54 GA.
L. REV. 111 (2019) (taking the position that the Supreme Court should reverse the Eleventh
Circuit and reinstate the U.S. District Court’s decision).
272 Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org, Inc., 140 S. Ct. 1498 (2020); see also Darren Ford, Supreme
Court Offers Guidance Regarding Eligibility of State Legislative Records for Protection Under the Copyright
Act, GRAYDON HEAD & RITCHEY LLP (Apr. 28, 2020), https://graydon.law/supreme-courtoffers-guidance-regarding-eligibility-of-state-legislative-records-for-protection-under-thecopyright-act/.
273 Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org, 140 S. Ct. 1498, 1506, 1508 (2020).
274 The legislature established a Code Revision Study Committee. It evaluated Georgia Code
and concluded recodification was needed. It also recommended that there should be an official
publication of the Code, controlled by the legislature. Georgia v. Harrison Co., 548 F. Supp.
110, 112. (N.D. Ga. 1982). See generally Elizabeth Holland, Will You Have to Pay for the O.C.G.A.?:
Copyrighting the Official Code of Georgia Annotated, 26 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 99, 109-115
(2019)(discussing Georgia’s Code revision process). The Code Revision Commission’s powers
are set forth in O.C.G.A. § 28-9-3. Those powers include:
(9) To prepare, or provide for the preparation of, and to include in the Code
such annotations, historical notes, research references, notes on law review articles, crossreferences, summaries of the opinions of the Attorney General of Georgia, editor's notes,
Code Revision Commission notes, comments, commentaries, rules and regulations,
indexes, tables, and other material as the commission determines to be useful to users
of the Code; . . . (10) To provide for the publication of annotated or
271

https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/jipl/vol29/iss1/3

36

Shipley: Copyright Law Jurisprudence

2021]

COPYRIGHT LAW JURISPRUDENCE

103

Company275 to “codify, revise, index, print, bind, and deliver according to the
directions of the Commission . . . a revised and recodified code of Georgia, which
was to be designated as the ‘Official Code of Georgia Annotated.’”276 It was a
‘work for hire’ under the Copyright Act,277 with Georgia holding the copyright
pursuant to the enabling legislation and the contract with Michie.278 The new
Code, as annotated, had the state’s imprimatur,279 and the U.S. District Court for
the Northern District of Georgia noted in 1982 that attorneys who cite unofficial
versions of the Code did so at their peril because the Michie version was
controlling.280
The Commission entered a new agreement in 2006 with Matthew Bender &
Co., a division of Lexis/Nexis. This agreement also required the Official Code
unannotated versions of the Code, or both; . . . (15) To negotiate and
grant licenses or rights, on behalf of the state, to use such material upon
such terms and conditions as the commission shall determine to be in the
best interest of the state; . . . (emphasis added).
275 The Commission heard presentations from five publishers. Harrison Co., 548 F. at 112. The
several versions of the Code published since 1933 had been under several titles including
Georgia Code Annotated, Code of Georgia Annotated, and Georgia Code Unannotated. Id.
276 Id.
277 17 U.S.C. § 101 (defining “work made for hire”); 17 U.S.C. § 201.
278 Harrison Co., 548 F. at 112. The Commission developed the numbering system and the rules
of style used in the Code, and when the editorial process was completed, a manuscript was
presented to the legislature and enacted at the 1981 extraordinary session. Annotations,
indexes, and other notes and materials then were added to the manuscript to produce
Georgia’s first official Code since 1933. Code Revision Comm’n v. Public.Resource.Org, Inc.,
244 F. Supp. 3d 1350, 1353 (N.D. Ga. 2017).
279 Lawyers serving in the Georgia General Assembly were strongly in favor of having an
annotated code with “explanations to the statutory provisions which interpret judicial
opinions, attorney general guidance documents, and law review and journal articles that relate
to the statute.” Holland, supra note 274, at 111. They felt that annotations helped lawyers find
how to apply the law, and essentially to practice law. Holland, supra note 274, at 111 (quoting
the Commission’s counsel and lawyer in the House who served on the Commission). See also
Adam Liptak, Accused of ‘Terrorism’ for Putting Legal Materials Online, N.Y. TIMES (May 13, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/13/us/politics/georgia-official-code-copyright.html;
Kyle Jahner, Firms, Lawyers, States Want High Court to Weigh in on Annotations, BLOOMBERG LAW
IP LAW NEWS (May 23, 2019, 4:46 AM), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/ip-law/firmslawyers-states-want-high-court-to-weigh-in-on-annotations (additional commentary on the
copyright litigation concerning the Official Code of Georgia Annotated).
280 Harrison Co., 548 F. at 117. In addition, the lawyer legislators did not want practitioners to
have to buy two versions of the code–the official version and an unofficial annotated version.
See Holland, supra note 274, at 111 (detailed discussion of how the O.C.G.A. was written and
adopted). This intent is reflected in the legislation that empowered the Commission to contract
with a publisher and to prepare “annotations, historical notes, research references, notes on
law reviews articles, cross references, [and] summaries of the opinions of the Attorney General
of Georgia” and other material the Commission determines to be useful to users of the Code.
Holland, supra note 274, at 111. See also GA. CODE ANN. § 28-9-3(9) (2021).
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of Georgia to include annotations, captions, editorial notes, chapter analyses, and
other materials.281
Each O.C.G.A. volume and supplement therefore contains
statutory text and non-statutory annotation text, including
judicial decision summaries, editor’s notes, research references,
notes on law review articles, summaries of the Attorney
General of Georgia, indexes, and title, chapter, article, part, and
subpart captions, which are all prepared by Lexis/Nexis under
the requirements of the Agreement.282
The agreement also required Lexis/Nexis to provide an appropriate
copyright notice on the free public website and on the online Code made
available as part of its for-profit service. Lexis/Nexis also notified users that
reproduction of the Code, other than statutory text and numbering, was
prohibited.283 In essence, “[t]he Commission asserts a copyright in all portions
of the OCGA except for the statutory text, which it recognizes cannot be
copyrighted.”284
Public.Resource.Org (PRO) purchased a print edition of the O.C.G.A. and
its supplements, scanned everything, and uploaded these scanned materials to its
website, where they became accessible to the public free of charge. The Code
Revision Commission demanded that PRO stop infringing the state’s copyright.
PRO responded that the state’s copyright was invalid because the law cannot be
copyrighted.285 The Commission, acting on behalf of the General Assembly and
the State of Georgia, sued PRO in 2015.286 The U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of Georgia ruled in favor of the Commission in 2017,287
concluding that the annotations lacked the force of law and were not in the public

Public.Resource.Org, 244 F. Supp. 3d at 1553.
Id. (citations omitted) (quoting from the Agreement between the Commission and Matthew
Bender). Lexis/Nexis is also required to summarize all published opinions of the Georgia
Supreme Court and Court of Appeals as well as all published opinions of the U.S. Supreme
Court and other federal courts that arose in Georgia and construe Georgia’s general statutes.
283 Id. at 1354; Code Revision Comm’n v. Public.Resource.Org, Inc., 906 F.3d 1229, 1234
(11th Cir. 2018).
284 Code Revision Comm’n v. Public.Resource.Org, Inc., 906 F.3d 1229, 1234 (11th Cir. 2018)
(“The publication agreement also provides that ‘[a]ll contents of the Code . . . shall be
copyrighted in the name of the State of Georgia . . . [and] [t]he copyrights shall cover all
copyrightable parts of the Code.’”).
285 Id. at 1235.
286 Id.
287 Code Revision Comm’n v. Public.Resource.Org, Inc., 244 F. Supp. 3d 1350, 1350 (N.D.
Ga. 2017).
281
282

https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/jipl/vol29/iss1/3

38

Shipley: Copyright Law Jurisprudence

2021]

COPYRIGHT LAW JURISPRUDENCE

105

domain.288 It held that state’s copyright protected the annotations and research
aids in the Official Code of Georgia.289
The Eleventh Circuit reversed and remanded after concluding that the People
were the ultimate authors of the annotations, that the annotations were law-like,
and that they were not copyrightable.290 The court acknowledged that the
enabling statutes provided that the annotations and commentaries were not law.
“Despite the fact that they are part of the official Code, Georgia law says that the
annotations themselves do not have the force of law in the way that the statutory
portions of the Code do.”291 It also pointed out that another provision in the
enabling legislation stated that “[t]he statutory portion of such codification shall
be merged with annotations, captions, catchlines, history lines, editorial notes, crossreferences, indices, title and chapter analyses, and other materials . . . ."292
The Eleventh Circuit emphasized the “merged with annotations” language
when it explained that the annotations were “the sovereign expression of the
People by their legislature” and therefore in the public domain.293 The court
made this explanation notwithstanding the General Assembly’s repeated
statements that the annotations and commentaries were not part of the law.
The court did not state, however, that the annotations had the force of law.
Instead, it said that they fell into “a zone of indeterminacy at the frontier between
edicts that carry the force of law and those that do not.”294 They are part and
parcel of the law and so enmeshed with Georgia’s law as to be inextricable. They
are law-like and uncopyrightable.295 The court reached this conclusion by relying
Public.Resource.Org, 906 F.3d at 1235 (discussing Code Revision Commission v. Public.Resource.Org,
Inc., 244 F. Supp. 3d 1350, 1353 (N.D. Ga. 2017). The lower court also rejected the fair use
defense asserted by the defendant. It was permanently enjoined from all unauthorized use of
the O.C.G.A. and ordered to remove all versions of the O.C.G.A. from its website.).
289 Public.Resource.Org, 244 F. Supp. 3d at 1357.
290 Code Revision Comm’n v. Public.Resource.Org, Inc., 906 F.3d 1229, 1233, 1243 (11th Cir.
2018). The court had no occasion to address the parties’ arguments concerning originality and
fair use.
291 Id. at 1233-34. The court also quoted section 1-1-7 of the O.C.G.A. that states “[a]ll
historical citations, title and chapter analyses, and notes set out in this Code are given for the
purpose of convenient reference and do not constitute part of the law.” The court also
acknowledged that laws passed during each session of the General assembly that reenact the
Code state that the annotations “contained in the Official Code of Georgia Annotated are not
enacted as statutes by the provisions of this Act.” Id. at 1233-34 (quoting 2015 Ga. Laws 9, §
54).
292 Public.Resource.Org, 906 F.3d at 1245 (emphasis added) (quoting Official Code of Georgia
Annotated § 1-1-1 (Ga. L. 1982, p 3, §1)).
293 Id. at 1232-33 (quoting Official Code of Georgia Annotated § 1-1-1 (Ga. L. 1982, p 3, §1))
(these annotations are part of the official Code because they “shall be merged” with the
statutory portions).
294 Id. at 1242.
295 Id. at 1243.
288
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on: (1) the identity of the public officials who created the work; (2) the
authoritativeness of the work; and (3) the process by which the work is created.296
The United States Supreme Court affirmed 5-4, but the majority did not
adopt the Eleventh Circuit’s analysis.297 Instead, it held that any work, including
a state code’s non-binding annotations and commentary, authored by or for the
state’s legislature in the course of its legislative duties, is ineligible for copyright
protection.298 The Supreme Court discussed the holdings of three 19th century
decisions dealing with judicial opinions. It said that judges, because they have the
authority to make and interpret the law, cannot be the ‘author’ of any work
prepared in their judicial capacity.299
This long-standing rule, called the government edicts doctrine, denies
copyright protection to judicial opinions and non-binding works such as
headnotes.300 The Court determined that the doctrine also applied to legislators
acting in their legislative capacity, and bars copyright protection not only for
legislation, but also for explanatory and procedural materials like the annotations
and commentary.301
Turning to Georgia’s code, the Supreme Court said that Code Commission
was the author of the annotations even though they were prepared by a private
company because the writing was done under a work-for-hire agreement with
the Code Commission.302 The majority recognized that the Commission was not
the General Assembly but said it functioned as the legislature’s arm in producing
the annotations.303 After all, the Commission was created by the legislature for
the legislature, it consists largely of legislators, and its funding and staff were
designated by the legislative branch.304
Moreover, the annotations were approved by the General Assembly before
being merged with the O.C.G.A.’s statutory text.305 In addition, this approval
was done by legislators in the course of their legislative duties. The explanatory
annotations were treated as analogous to the syllabi and headnotes prepared by

Id. at 1232, 1243-54. The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari on June 24, 2019.
Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org, Inc., 140 S. Ct. 1498 (2020).
298 Id. at 1506; Dasha Chestukhin, U.S. Supreme Court Finds No Copyright Protection for Works
Prepared by Legislators Or Judges in the Course of Official Duties, COWAN LIEBOWITZ & LATMAN (May
1, 2020), https://www.cll.com/CopyrightDevelopmentsBlog/u-s-supreme-court-findsnocopyright?utm_source=Mondaq&utm_medium=
syndication&utm_campaign=LinkedIn-integration.
299 Public.Resource.Org, 140 S. Ct. at 1506-07.
300 Id. at 1506.
301 Id.
302 Id. at 1508.
303 Id.
304 Id.
305 Public.Resource.Org, 140 S. Ct. at 1508.
296
297
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judges.306 They are deemed relevant by the legislature, published along with the
statutory text, and seen as falling within the work performed by the legislators in
their legislative capacity.307 Accordingly, they were not copyrightable even
though they lacked the force of law.308
Justice Thomas dissented. He said that the government edicts doctrine should
not be extended to annotations since they lack the force of law.309 Justice
Ginsburg’s dissenting opinion contended that the Code Revision Commission
did not create the annotations as part of the legislature’s lawmaking process. She
reached this conclusion because the Commission generated the annotations after
the General Assembly enacted the laws.310
The long-term impact of Code Revision Commission v. Public.Resource.Org is
uncertain. The ruling puts annotated state codes in the public domain, and this
may expand public access. There is, however, concern that the decision may
ultimately reduce access. The annotations and commentary are prepared by
private companies like Lexis/Nexis under contract with a state’s legislative or
judicial branch. Those private companies had the incentive of copyright law to
produce works that would produce them a profit.
Since the annotations are no longer copyrightable, those private companies
may decline to spend time and resources to prepare these works.311 About a third
of the states have arrangements with private companies to write annotated codes
similar to Georgia’s arrangement with Matthew Bender.312 Still, the Eleventh
Circuit first extended the rationale of the government edicts doctrine decisions
Id. at 1509.
Id.
308 Id. See also Preston H. Heard & Emily Scheible Whittaker, Georgia's Loss is the Public's Gain:
Supreme Court Says States May Not Copyright Legal Codes, WOMBLE BOND DICKINSON (Apr. 27,
2020), https://www.womblebonddickinson.com/us/insights/alerts/georgias-loss-publicsgain-supreme-court-says-states-may-not-copyright-legal-codes (commentary on the Supreme
Court’s decision and its impact).
309 Public.Resource.Org, 140 S. Ct. at 1514-15 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Justice Alito joined this
dissent in full, and Justice Breyer joined in part.
310 Id. at 1522-23 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Justice Breyer joined this dissent. Supreme Court
Holds That Georgia Cannot Copyright the Annotations to Its Laws, MAYER BROWN (Apr. 27, 2020),
https://www.appellate.net/resources/supreme-court-holds-that-georgia-cannot-copyrightthe-annotations-to-its-laws/.
311 Dasha Chestukhin, U.S. Supreme Court Finds No Copyright Protection for Works Prepared by
Legislators Or Judges in the Course of Official Duties, COWAN LIEBOWITZ & LATMAN (May 1, 2020),
https://www.cll.com/CopyrightDevelopmentsBlog/u-s-supreme-court-findsnocopyright?utm_source=Mondaq&utm_medium=
syndication&utm_campaign=LinkedIn-integration. See also Public.Resource.Org, 140 S. Ct. at
1522 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
312
Statutory
Editorial
Process,
LEXISNEXIS,
http://www.lexisnexis.com/documents/pdf/20170303045425_large.pdf (last visited Oct. 25,
2021).
306
307
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from the late 19th Century to cover the annotations and commentary in Georgia’s
official code. Even though the U.S. Supreme Court did not accept the Eleventh
Circuit’s rationale for this outcome, it affirmed this critical decision on what is
copyrightable and the scope of that copyright protection.
IV. FAIR USE IN THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
A. THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND FAIR USE

Determining fair use is one of the most troubling issues in copyright law.313
This important affirmative defense balances the statute’s incentives to create,
against the public’s interest in the dissemination of ideas.314 Several Eleventh
Circuit decisions issued before the U.S. Supreme Court’s influential 1985
decision in Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, Inc. should be
noted.315 These opinions recognized that fair use is solicitous of free speech
interests because it permits a defendant to reproduce some protected expression
for a productive purpose. These productive purposes include criticism and news
reporting, and the infringement suit can be resolved without turning to a First
Amendment defense.
The Supreme Court in Harper & Row answered several questions about the
interplay between copyright and free speech principles while refusing to create a
public figure exception to copyright.316 The Court made clear that a finding of
fair use would conclude a matter without the trial court needing to rule on
whether the alleged infringer’s use was protected speech.317 In reaching similar

Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 475 (1984) (Blackmun, J.,
dis senting). For illustrations by the Supreme Court of the troublesome nature of the doctrine,
see the 5-4 decision in Sony, 464 U.S. 417 (1984), the 6-2 decision in Google LLC v. Oracle
America, Inc., 141 S. Ct. 1183 (2021) (holding that Google’s copying of some of Oracle’s APIs
was a fair use), the 6-3 decision in Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S.
539 (1985), the 4 – 4 split in Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States, 487 F.2d 1345 (Ct. Cl.
1973), aff’d by an equally divided Court, 420 U.S. 376 (1975), and the 4 – 4 split in Benny v. Loew’s,
Inc., 239 F.2d 532 (9th Cir. 1956), aff’d by an equally divided Court sub nom. Columbia Broadcasting
System, Inc. v. Loew’s, Inc., 356 U.S. 43 (1958).
314 See, e.g., Wendy J. Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure: A Structural and Economic Analysis of the
Betamax Case and Its Predecessors, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1600, 1614 (1982) (“Fair use should be
awarded to the defendant in a copyright infringement action when (1) market failure is present;
(2) transfer of the use to defendant is socially desirable; and (3) an award of fair use would not
cause substantial injury to the incentives of the plaintiff copyright owner.”).
315 Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 539.
316 David E. Shipley, Conflicts Between Copyright and the First Amendment After Harper & Row,
Publishers v. Nation Enterprises, 1986 BYU L. REV. 983, 984 (1986).
317 Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 556-60; Shipley, supra note 313, at 1006-07. See, e.g., Triangle
Publ’ns, Inc. v. Knight-Ridder Newspapers, Inc., 626 F.2d 1171 (5th Cir. 1980); Pac. & S. Co.
313

https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/jipl/vol29/iss1/3

42

Shipley: Copyright Law Jurisprudence

2021]

COPYRIGHT LAW JURISPRUDENCE

109

conclusions, the Eleventh Circuit did not say that copyright was the engine of
free expression as the Supreme Court did in Harper & Row.318 The court easily
could have made such a statement.
Shortly before the split of the old Fifth Circuit in 1981, the Fifth Circuit Court
of Appeals decided Triangle Publications, Inc. v. Knight-Ridder Newspapers, Inc.319 This
case concerned the Miami Herald’s use of the plaintiff’s copyrighted TV Guide
cover for comparative advertising. The trial court held that the newspaper’s
copying of the cover infringed the display and reproduction rights and was not a
fair use.320 The court concluded, however, that the First Amendment mandated
that the Herald’s actions were protected commercial speech.321 The court of
appeals affirmed, but on fair use grounds instead of turning to the First
Amendment.322
A couple of years later, in Pacific & Southern Co. v. Duncan, the Eleventh Circuit
upheld an injunction blocking the defendant from copying the plaintiff’s news
broadcasts.323 In this case, the court said the plaintiff’s efforts to enforce its
copyright did not conflict with the First Amendment.324 The plaintiff’s station in
Atlanta showed four local news programs daily and sold tapes of its broadcasts
to the public.325 The defendant’s TV News Clips service made unauthorized
recordings of news reports and sold the tapes to persons and entities mentioned
in the televised segments.
The plaintiff sued, and the defendant raised a First Amendment defense as
well as fair use.326 The lower court found for the plaintiff, holding that the
defendant’s reproduction of the news broadcasts was not fair use, and the
Eleventh Circuit affirmed.327 There was no need for the court to turn to the First

v. Duncan, 744 F.2d 1490 (11th Cir. 1984); Pillsbury Co. v. Milky Way Prods., 215 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 124 (N.D. Ga. 1981)
318 Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 558. Incidentally, the Supreme Court’s 2021 decision in Google
LLC v. Oracle America, Inc., 141 S. Ct. 1183 (2021) made clear that the issue of fair use is to be
addressed as a matter of law, rather than a fact issue for the jury to decide. Decoded: The Supreme
Court Rules on Fair Use in Landmark Software Copyright Case, VORYS SATER SEYMOUR & PEASE
LLP CLIENT ALERTS (Apr. 6, 2021), https://www.vorys.com/publications-2898.html.
319 Triangle Publ’ns, Inc. v. Knight-Ridder Newspapers, Inc., 445 F. Supp. 875 (S.D. Fla. 1978),
aff’d on other grounds, 626 F.2d 1171 (5th Cir. 1980).
320 Triangle Publications, 626 F.2d at 1173.
321 Id.
322 Id. at 1172.
323 Pac. & S. Co. v. Duncan, 744 F.2d 1490, 1493 (11th Cir. 1984).
324 Id. at 1498. The court also held that enforcement of the plaintiff’s copyright did not offend
the Constitution’s copyright clause. Id. at 1499.
325 Id at 1493.
326 Id. at 1494.
327 Id. at 1493.
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Amendment because the defendant’s use was neither productive nor creative.328
Moreover, defendant’s copying of the broadcasts was a commercial use that
adversely affected the market for and value of the plaintiff’s works.329
B. PARODY AND FAIR USE

The U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Georgia has decided
several copyright infringement cases in which the defendants contended that
they had parodied the plaintiffs’ works, and that their parodies were fair use.330
The court’s fair use analysis in these cases foreshadowed the U.S. Supreme
Court’s fair use decision in Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music.331
Pillsbury Co. v. Milky Way Productions Inc.,332 involved infringement claims
against pornographic adaptations of Pillsbury’s characters ‘Poppin Fresh’ and
‘Poppie Fresh’ along with the company’s jingles, “Nothin says lovin’ like
something from the oven” and “Pillsbury says it best.”333 The defendant
admitted to using the copyrighted jingles and depicting the copyrighted
characters having sex.334 Notwithstanding the pornographic use of the plaintiff’s
works, the court found fair use.335
The court declined the defendant’s request to characterize its use of the
copyrighted characters and jingles as parody or satire.336 Instead, it stated that:
[a]fter reviewing Milky Way’s presentation, the court concludes
that it is more in the nature of an editorial or social
commentary than it is an attempt to capitalize financially on
Id. at 1496, 1498.
Pacific, 744 F.2d at 1496. See also Radabaugh v. Clay Turner Realty Grp., LLC, No. CV 120058, 2021 WL 2463576 (S.D. Ga. 2021) (summary judgment against defendant’s unauthorized
commercial use of plaintiff’s creative photograph in its entirety on website and this weighed
against a finding of fair use).
330 Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc. v. Showcase Atlanta Coop. Prods.,
Inc. 479 F. Supp. 351 (N.D. Ga. 1979); Pillsbury Co. v. Milky
Way Prods., Inc., 215 U.S.P.Q. 124 N.D. Ga. 1981).
331 510 U.S. 569 (1994).
332 215 U.S.P.Q. 124 (N.D. Ga. 1981). The District Court’s reasoning in Pillsbury, finding fair
use, was largely adopted by the Supreme Court over a decade later in Campbell. See infra text
and notes accompanying notes 343–54 (discussion of the Supreme Court’s decision in Campbell
v. Acuff-Rose Music).
333 215 U.S.P.Q. at 126.
334 Id. at 125-26.
335 Id. at 131-32.
336 Id. at 129-30. The court said Milky Way had not furnished it with any basis for making this
determination and noted that the terms satire and parody did not have a fixed definition among
literary critics.
328
329
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the plaintiff’s original work. Although the portrayal is offensive
to the court, the court has no doubt that Milky Way intended
to make an editorial comment on the values epitomized by
these trade characters.337
Meanwhile, the plaintiff also argued that the court should consider the
salacious content of the defendant’s Screw magazine. The court responded:
[t]he plaintiff seems to believe that a pornographic adaptation
of copyrighted works should be accorded less protection under
the fair use doctrine than what might otherwise be granted a
more continent presentation. The Copyright Act, however,
does not expressly exclude pornographic materials from the
parameters of the fair use defense, and the plaintiff offers no
authority for this protection. The character of the
unauthorized use is relevant, but, in the court’s judgment, the
fact that the use is pornographic in nature does not militate
against a finding of fair use.338
The court distinguished its earlier decision in Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc. v.
Showcase Atlanta Cooperative Productions, Inc., in which it ruled against a fair use
defense and found infringement.339 This litigation was about a three-hour-long
musical called Scarlett Fever based on Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer’s classic movie, Gone
With the Wind.340 The trial court had held that the musical was neither a satire nor
a parody and that even if it was a parody, the defendant had copied far more than
the law allowed.341 The musical was neither salacious nor obscene.342
Id. at 131 (footnote omitted).
Pillsbury, 215 U.S.P.Q. at 131 (footnote omitted). The court later said that it did not condone
the manner in which the defendant chose to assault the defendant corporation, but that value
judgments had no place in the analysis. Id. at 132.
339 Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc. v. Showcase Atlanta Coop. Prods., Inc., 479 F. Supp. 351
(N.D. Ga. 1979).
340 Id. at 354.
341 Id. at 352. Summary judgment was eventually decided for Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer and
against defendant’s fair use defense. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc. v. Showcase Atlanta Coop.
Prods., Inc., No. C79-1766A, 1981 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15976, at *10-11 (N.D. Ga. Aug. 26,
1981).
342 David E. Shipley, A Dangerous Undertaking Indeed: Juvenile Humor, Raunchy Jokes, Obscene
Materials and Bad Taste in Copyright, 98 KY. L. J. 517, 543 n. 177 (2010). See also D.C. Comics,
Inc. v. Unlimited Monkey Bus., Inc., 598 F. Supp. 110, 118-19 (N.D. Ga. 1984) (unauthorized
imitation of plaintiffs’ comic and cartoon characters in singing telegram business held to
infringe, and the defendant’s fair use defense failed in part they did not engage in any critical
comment and instead sought to augment the value of their own property by creating
detrimental associations with the plaintiff’s property).
337
338
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The United States Supreme Court addressed parody as fair use in 1994 in
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc.343 The case concerned an unauthorized rap
version of a 1964 hit by Roy Orbison and William Dees titled ‘Oh, Pretty
Woman.’ Luther Campbell and his group 2 Live Crew did their parody recording
after Acuff-Rose Music, the copyright owner, denied their request for
permission.344 Campbell’s version copied the original work’s characteristic
opening bass riff and “repeated it, but also produced otherwise distinctive
sounds, interposing ‘scraper’ noise, overlaying the music with solos in different
keys, and altering the drum beat.”345 He also copied the opening line from
Orbison’s song but then added his own words that “quickly degenerate[d] into a
play on words, substituting predictable lyrics with shocking ones.”346
The trial court concluded that Campbell’s song was a fair use parody,347 but
the Sixth Circuit reversed. The defendant’s commercial use was presumptively
unfair, and the parody took too much protected expression from the plaintiff’s
hit song.348 The Supreme Court reversed following a thorough analysis and
application of each factor codified in section 107 of the Copyright Act.349 In
doing so, the Court elevated the transformative use doctrine to special status in
the fair use analysis,350 and aligned itself with other “courts that have held that
parody, like other comment or criticism, may claim fair use under § 107.”351 It
stated, “the heart of any parodist’s claim to quote from existing material, is the
use of some elements of a prior author’s composition to create a new one that,
at least in part, comments on that author’s work.”352 The Court also said that
“[p]arody needs to mimic an original to make its point, and so has some claim to

Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1994).
Id. at 572-73.
345 Id. at 589 (footnote omitted).
346 Id. at 573 (quoting Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. v. Campbell, 754 F. Supp. 1150, 1154-55 (M.D.
Tenn. 1991).
347 Id. (quoting Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. v. Campbell, 754 F. Supp. 1150, 1154-55, 1157-58
(M.D. Tenn. 1991)).
348 Id. at 573-74.
349 Campbell, 510 U.S. at 572-94.
350 JOYCE ET AL., supra note 2, at 857; David E. Shipley, A Transformative Use Taxonomy: Making
Sense of the Transformative Use Standard, 63 WAYNE L. REV. 267, 274 (2018). Google’s use of
Oracle’s APIs was held to be transformative by the Supreme Court in Google LLC v. Oracle
America, Inc., 141 S. Ct. 1183, 1204 (2021). The Court said that “Google’s use of the Sun Java
API seeks to create new products. It seeks to expand the use and usefulness of Android-based
smartphones. Its new product offers programmers a highly creative and innovative tool for a
smartphone environment. To the extent that Google used parts of the Sun Java API to create
a new platform that could be readily used by programmers, its use was consistent with that
creative “progress” that is the basic constitutional objective of copyright itself.” Id. at 1203.
351 Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994).
352 Id. at 580.
343
344
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use the creation of its victim’s . . . imagination, whereas satire can stand on its
own two feet and requires justification for the very act of borrowing.”353 This
statement does not mean, however, that satire cannot be a fair use.354
Not long after the Supreme Court decided Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc.,
the Eleventh Circuit discussed parody and the transformative use doctrine in
SunTrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co.355 The defendant published Alice Randall’s
book The Wind Done Gone in 2001. Ms. Randall’s novel was derived from Margaret
Mitchell’s 1936 novel, Gone With the Wind (GWTW), and it retold Mitchell’s story
from the perspective of a mixed-race, slave half-sister of Scarlett O’Hara. The
Wind Done Gone, written without permission of the Mitchell estate, referred to
GWTW in its forward and copied plot elements, major characters, traits,
relationships, scenes, descriptions, and dialogues.356 The estate would never
permit a sequel of GWTW with miscegenation or homosexuality, and The Wind
Done Gone had both.357 SunTrust, on behalf of the author’s heirs as trustee, sued
for copyright infringement and won in the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Georgia.358
The Eleventh Circuit reversed, holding that the defendant’s novel was fair
use.359 It was a critique and parody of GWTW that had both verbatim and
nonliteral copying of the 1936 novel’s plot and characters.360 It commented on
the original work by appropriating characters and elements to conjure up the
novel for readers, and used those elements to criticize the novel’s depiction of
slavery and race relations in the antebellum South.361 The transformative nature
of The Wind Done Gone outweighed the defendant’s commercial purpose. The
author added new expression and meaning to Mitchell’s novel by changing it
from a third-person epic to a first-person diary and memoir.362 In addition, the
second half of the defendant’s novel was a new story featuring plot elements not
found in the original.363 The nature of the copyrighted work factor carried little
weight since a parody is based invariably on a well-known expressive work. The
court did not determine whether the amount of the copying from GWTW was

Id. at 580-81.
Shipley, A Dangerous Undertaking Indeed, supra note 342, at 558.
355 SunTrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257 (11th Cir. 2001).
356 Id. at 1259. See also JOYCE ET AL., supra note 2, at 842-43 n.13 (discussion of the extensive
‘conjuring up’ in Wind Done Gone).
357 268 F.3d at 1282.
358 Id. at 1259.
359 Id. at 1277.
360 Id. at 1259.
361 Id. at 1270.
362 Id. at 1279.
363 Id. at 1270.
353
354
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excessive in relation to the defendant’s purpose.364 Finally, the court said the
plaintiff’s evidence did not show that the defendant’s novel would have a
deleterious effect on the market for GWTW by displacing sales.365
The U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Georgia held that The
Elf of the Shelf (Elf Off), a raunchy version of the popular children’s Christmas
book, The Elf on the Shelf (Elf On), was a parody and fair use in CCA and B, LLC
v. F + W Media Inc.366 The books had similar covers and jackets, but the
defendant’s elf narrator used crude language, drank spiked eggnog, hit on Barbie
while Ken was away, and watched pornography.367 The district court relied on
Campbell in finding that the defendant’s book was a parody directed at the
plaintiff’s work,368 and that it was a transformative use by depicting the elf in an
unromantic setting that demystified the magic of plaintiff’s Elf On.369
The court determined that the extent of the defendant’s copying was
appropriate in order to comment on Elf On,370 and there was no evidence of
market harm.371 The court said it was improbable that sales of the defendant’s
book would replace sales of Elf On.372 Citing the Suntrust decision, the court
noted that the plaintiff “failed to meet its burden of proving . . . a substantial
likelihood that Defendant’s fair use defense will not succeed.”373
A problem with post-Campbell parody case law is uncertainty about
determining whether a defendant’s challenged use is actually a parody that
criticizes or comments on the plaintiff’s original work of authorship. Does the
defendant’s entertaining pastiche or spoof truly comment on the plaintiff’s
popular work? Or, was the plaintiff’s work easy to use as a vehicle for getting
laughs or making a snarky comment about a general social issue?374 This
Id. at 1274.
Id. at 1275-76. See also Katz v. Google Inc., 802 F.3d 1178 (11th Cir. 2015) (reproduction
of an embarrassing copyrighted photo of the plaintiff in blog articles critical of the plaintiff’s
business practices was a transformative use and fair in that it criticized and satirized the
plaintiff’s character—the plaintiff had purchased the copyright to the photo from the
photographer before suing the blogger). See generally Shipley, A Transformative Use Taxonomy,
supra note 350, at 287 n. 126 (citations of decisions that illustrate the difficulty of determining
whether a spoof or take-off is a parody); Shipley, A Dangerous Undertaking Indeed, supra note
342, at 571 n. 387 (citing The Wind Done Gone case and another decision for the proposition
that the line between parody and satire is arbitrary).
366 CCA & B, LLC v. F + W Media Inc., 819 F. Supp. 2d 1310 (N.D. Ga. 2011).
367 Id. at 1316-17.
368 Id. at 1318-19.
369 Id. at 1321-22.
370 Id. at 1322-23.
371 CCA & B, 819 F. Supp. 2d at 1323-24.
372 Id. at 1323.
373 Id. at 1324.
374 Shipley, A Transformative Use Taxonomy, supra note 350, at 287.
364
365
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uncertainty has not troubled courts in the Eleventh Circuit. The circuit’s firm
approach is evidenced by fair use rulings involving the pornographic uses of
Pillsbury’s characters, the controversial Wind Done Gone sequel to Gone With the
Wind, and the raunchy version of Elf on the Shelf.375 In each of these cases, the
courts readily found that the defendants were commenting on the plaintiffs’ wellknown copyrighted works in concluding that the challenged uses were fair.
C. FAIR USE AND THE REPRODUCTION OF WORKS FOR EDUCATIONAL
PURPOSES

The preamble to the Copyright Act’s fair use provision lists using a protected
work for the purpose of ‘teaching’ as an example of a fair use.376 The Supreme
Court acknowledged in Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music that an “obvious statutory
exception to this focus on transformative uses is the straight reproduction of
multiple copies for classroom distribution.”377 Moreover, the “multiple copies
for classroom use” language in section 107378 was tracked by the Supreme Court
in Campbell. This language, however, is about photocopies.379 Section 107 and its
legislative history do not address using digital technology to reproduce protected
works and making them available for educational purposes. The Eleventh Circuit
grappled with digitization and fair use for twelve years in litigation concerning
digital reserves at Georgia State University.

See supra notes 332 to 373 and accompanying text. Nothing in the Supreme Court’s recent
decision, Google LLC v. Oracle America, Inc., 141 S. Ct. 1183 (2021), should alter the Eleventh
Circuit’s generous approach to fair use generally and the transformative use doctrine
specifically. After all, the Court found fair use transformation in Google’s copying of Oracle’s
programming code used in its JAVA APIs. Id. at 1209. What Google did with JAVA “was a
fair use of that material as a matter of law” because it “reimplemented a user interface, taking
only what was needed to allow users to put their accrued talents to work in a new and
transformative program . . . .” Id. Lawrence Veregin, Planet of the APIs: U.S. Supreme Court Rules
Google’s Use of Java APIs in Android Is Fair Use, SPOTLIGHT (Apr. 8, 2021),
https://www.airdberlis.com/insights/blogs/thespotlight/post/ts-item/planet-of-the-apisu.s.-supreme-court-rules-google-s-use-of-java-apis-in-android-is-fair-use.
376 17 U.S.C. § 107. The fact that a use is for an educational purpose does not, however,
guarantee a finding of fair use. See, e.g., Peter Letterese & Assocs. v. World Inst. of Scientology
Enters., 533 F.3d 1287, 1317-18 (11th Cir. 2008) (ruling that defendants failed to prove their
entitlement to summary judgment based on fair use for using plaintiff’s instructional book, Big
League Sales Closing Techniques (BLS), for staff training material because the defendants’ uses
were not transformative and because there were genuine issues of material fact pertaining to
the fourth fair use factor–the effect on the market–in that the defendant’s course packets,
derived from BLS, may have damaged the market for BLS as a substitute).
377 Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 580 n.11 (1994).
378 17 U.S.C. § 107.
379 See generally JOYCE ET AL., supra note 2, at 875-77 (general discussion of photocopying and
digital reproduction).
375
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The Cambridge University Press and several other publishers sued Georgia
State in 2008, but there was not a published opinion until 2012.380 The plaintiffs
claimed copyright infringement resulting from the university’s electronic course
reserve practices that made excerpts from academic books available online to
students enrolled in particular courses.381 According to the trial court, the first
factor, “the purpose and character of the use,” favored Georgia State.382 It
referenced the preamble to section 107 and noted that the copying was “for
strictly nonprofit educational purposes” at a nonprofit educational institution.383
There was no need for the lower court to discuss the transformative use standard
given the Supreme Court’s explicit reference to copying for educational purposes
in Campbell.384
The second factor, “the nature of the copyrighted work,” favored Georgia
State because the reproduced works were informational.385 Factor three, “the
amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work
as a whole,” also worked in Georgia State’s favor since the extent of the copying
was limited by GSU’s e-Reserves policy. This policy restricted, for example, the
reproduced excerpts to ten percent of an article or one chapter from a book.386
Only the fourth factor, the impact of the use on the “market for or value of the
copyrighted work,” favored the publishers because the defendant’s use of the
excerpts affected the market for licensing those excerpts.387 Still, the trial court
said that fair use applied whenever at least three of the four factors favored the
defendant.388 It determined that of the 48 alleged instances of infringement, all
but five were fair use.389
The plaintiffs argued on appeal that the trial court’s analysis was flawed and
that it erred in finding fair use in those 43 instances.390 The Eleventh Circuit
reversed and remanded.391 It found fault with the trial court’s methodology of
using bright-line rules and a formula.392 It agreed that the first factor favored fair
use, but it emphasized that fair use analysis must be on a flexible, case-by-case
Cambridge Univ. Press v. Patton, 769 F.3d 1232 (11th Cir. 2014), rev’g and remanding 863 F.
Supp. 2d 1190 (N.D. Ga. 2012).
381 Id. at 1237.
382 Id. at 1249.
383 Id.
384 Id. at 1263 (citing Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 n.11 (1994)).
385 Id. at 1249.
386 Id. at 1251.
387 Id. at 1250.
388 Id. at 1251.
389 Id. at 1252.
390 Id. at 1253.
391 Id. at 1232.
392 Id at 1259-60.
380
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basis.393 It also stated that Georgia State’s use of the plaintiffs’ works was not
transformative, and that its uses “supersede[d] the object[s] of the original
creations.”394 The court acknowledged that the uses were for education at a nonprofit institution. However, it reminded the lower court that “the crux of the
profit/nonprofit distinction is . . . whether the user stands to profit from
exploitation of the copyrighted material without paying the customary price.”395
The court ultimately concluded that the lower court did not err in saying that
the first factor favored fair use and that this related to the fourth factor as well.396
It explained that the district court’s analysis properly took into account the
availability of licenses.397 The trial court erred, however, in concluding that the
second fair use factor favored Georgia State because excerpts in the e-Reserves
were informational and educational.398 Instead, the district court should have
concluded that this factor was neutral.399 Similarly, the appeals court said it was
an error to conclude automatically that ten percent of an article or one chapter
from a book was a safe harbor in connection with the third factor.400 Instead, the
trial court should have analyzed each instance individually.401
On remand, the district court went with an approximate weight per factor
formula, performed individualized inquiries for each of the works, and
concluded that 44 of the 48 were fair use.402 Once again, the Eleventh Circuit
sent the case back to the trial court, saying that the district court had failed to
break free of its arithmetic approach to fair use, and explained that the court
should have been more holistic.403
The most recent chapter in this litigation was a 130-page order from the
district court, issued in March 2020.404 The district court, in attempting to heed
the Eleventh Circuit’s instructions from 2018, once again examined the 48 works
still at issue and ultimately concluded that there were only 10 infringements.405

Id. at 1259, 1267.
Id. at 1263.
395 Id. at 1265.
396 Id. at 1267.
397 Id. at 1279.
398 Id. at 1270.
399 Id.
400 Id. at 1271.
401 Id. at 1272.
402 Id. at 1290, 1293, 1297.
403 Cambridge, 769 F.3d at 1300.
404 Cambridge Univ. Press v. Becker, 446 F. Supp. 3d 1145 (N.D. Ga. 2020).
405 Id. at 1271-72 (the summary lists the works that had been infringed); Final Order,
Cambridge Univ. Press v. Becker, No. 1:08-cv-01245-ODE, n.2 (N.D. Ga. 2020), ECF No.
583.
393
394
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The plaintiffs decided against filing a third appeal.406 The trial court entered
a final order on September 29, 2020.407 This ruling was a final judgment with
costs taxed against the plaintiffs. In the end, the publishers prevailed on only 10
of their original 99 claims; 89 of the challenged digitized excerpts were fair use.408
Although the defendants were the prevailing parties, the district court declined
to award attorney’s fees.409 The court ordered the defendants to maintain
copyright policies “which are not inconsistent with the rulings” of the Eleventh
Circuit.410
The Author’s Alliance supported Georgia State’s position that these limited
uses of copyrighted material for non-profit educational purposes fell within fair
use. They applauded the district court’s third ruling that had found a majority of
the challenged uses of unlicensed excerpts in the e-Reserves to be fair.411 The
Alliance contended that “academic authorial incentives to create scholarly book
chapters would not be impaired by a fair use ruling.”412
In contrast, the Association of American Publishers said that the trial court’s
2020 ruling was at odds with the Eleventh Circuit’s earlier rulings.413 The
Association added that “publishers are confident that the guidance from the
court of appeals is clear and authoritative as to future actors . . . [and] is adequate
to ensure that universities will maintain copyright policies and practices that are
consistent with its rulings and well-established copyright jurisprudence.”414
Georgia State was deemed the prevailing party by the U.S. District Court.
Nevertheless, the Association of American Publishers and the Copyright
Clearance Center said that the Eleventh Circuit “made clear that the kind of

The Association of American Publishers and the Copyright Clearance Center, along with
the Cambridge University Press, the Oxford University Press, and SAGE Publishing, issued a
statement on November 12, 2020 explaining why they had declined to file another appeal, thus
bringing this long running dispute to an end. Porter Anderson, AAP and CCC End Georgia
State ‘E-Reserves’ Copright Litigation, PUBLISHING PERSPECTIVES (Nov. 12, 2020)
https://publishingperspectives.com/2020/11/aap-and-copyright-clearance-center-endgeorgia-state-e-reserves-litigation/.
407 Order, Cambridge Univ. Press v. Becker, No. 1:08-cv-01245-ODE (N.D. Ga. 2020), ECF
No. 583.
408 Id. at 13.
409 Id.
410 Id.
411 Martin Adams, District Court Finds Majority of Uses to Be Fair in Georgia State’s E-Reserves Case,
AUTHORS ALLIANCE (Mar. 4, 2020), https://www.authorsalliance.org/2020/03/04/districtcourt-finds-majority-of-uses-to-be-fair-in-georgia-state-e-reserves-case/.
The
Authors
Alliance had filed an amicus brief in 2017 in support of Georgia State in the second appeal to
the Eleventh Circuit.
412 Id.
413 See Anderson, supra note 406 (this statement was made in the context of the plaintiffs’
explanation for not appealing the 2020 ruling).
414 Id.
406
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‘nontransformative copying’ undertaken by Georgia State University poses a
‘severe threat of market harm’ to publishers, and that such harm should be given
‘more significant weight in [the] overall fair use analysis’ and ‘strongly disfavors’
fair use where publishers have offered digital licenses for the material.” These
two entities added that that the “educational setting does not ameliorate the
‘threat of market substitution.’”415
The Georgia State e-Reserves litigation was a test case that ultimately “failed
to deliver any kind of easily understood, broadly applicable formula for
determining where the fair use line should be drawn.”416 Another comment on
the litigation stated,
when all is said and done, it is telling that the district court’s
ultimate fair use conclusions vary little in each of its three bites
of the apple. This suggests that the reason that this case has
dragged on for so long has more to do with the district court’s
transparency about its mode of analysis (about how the sausage
was made) than with its ultimate conclusions on the merits.417
V. CONCLUSION
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit has rendered
many important copyright law decisions in the last four decades. Its body of work
has been influential on a variety of copyright issues and topics. The court’s
discussion of the originality standard in Miller v. Universal City Studios, Inc., along
with its holding that copyright did not extend to research, was cited by the U.S.
Supreme Court in its landmark Feist decision.418 The Eleventh Circuit’s
application of the principles announced in Feist to compilations, directories,
computer software, architectural works, and other creative works like movies,
photographs and characters has been especially rigorous.419 The court has
consistently scrutinized works of authorship in order to separate copyrightable
expression from unprotectable elements. The court has done this by applying
Feist’s principles about authorship along with section 102(b) of the Copyright
Id. (quoting the joint statement from the Presidents of the Association of American
Publishers and the Copyright Clearance Center).
416 Andrew Albanese, Publishers Escape Fee Award as GSU E-Reserves Case Finally Ends,
PUBLISHERS WEEKLY (Oct. 2, 2020), https://www.publishersweekly.com/pw/bytopic/digital/copyright/article/84514-publishers-escape-fee-award-as-gsu-e-reserves-casefinally-ends.html.
417 Brian Murphy, Fantasies About a Formula for Fair Use, FRANKFURT KURNIT KLEIN & SELZ
PC (Mar. 11, 2020), https://advertisinglaw.fkks.com/post/102g134/fantasies-about-aformula-for-fair-use.
418 See supra text and notes accompanying notes 22–40.
419 See supra notes 58–241 and accompanying text.
415
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Act, the merger doctrine, and scènes à faire. The court’s Moghadam decision upheld
an anti-bootlegging statute under the Commerce Clause even though the statute
extended copyright-like protection to unfixed works. Other courts have followed
this decision.420 The Eleventh Circuit extended the venerable government edicts
doctrine to the annotations and commentary in the Official Code of Georgia
Annotated. The U.S. Supreme Court affirmed in the Code Revision Commission
decision, albeit on different grounds.421 Finally, the circuit’s fair use rulings show
a generous interpretation and application of this important defense. The court
has done this in the context of tensions between copyright and the First
Amendment, parody, and the use of protected works for educational purposes.422
These many decisions show that Eleventh Circuit’s copyright jurisprudence
has consistently adhered to the fundamental principle that copyright protection
extends only to creative expression. Ideas, facts, scènes à faire, and those elements
of a work that are standard, routine, commonplace, or dictated by efficiency are
not protected.423 As a result, everyone is free to use whatever is in the public
domain and whatever is unprotected by copyright in a work of authorship.424
Accordingly, it is established in the Eleventh Circuit that the use of a work and
the use of a copyright are distinct, in that one may use the unprotected elements
of work without infringing copyright.425 Reward to the author remains a
secondary consideration in the Eleventh Circuit because the primary beneficiary
of copyright is the public.426

See supra notes 242–69 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 270–312 and accompanying text.
422 See supra notes 313–417 and accompanying text.
423 Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 363(1991); Bateman v. Mnemonics,
Inc., 79 F.3d 1532, 1542 (11th Cir. 1996).
424 Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 231 (1964); Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite
Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234, 237 (1964); Shipley, Congressional Authority Over Intellectual Property,
supra note 18, at 1256-57.
425 Bateman, 79 F.3d at 1542 n.23 (11th Cir. 1996) (citing L. Ray Patterson, Understanding Fair
Use, 55 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 249, 259, 264 (1992)).
426 Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984) (citing Fox
Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123 (1932)) (stating that the copyright law makes reward to the
author a secondary consideration); Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340,
348 (1991) (“[t]he primary objective of copyright is not to reward the labor of authors, but
‘[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts.’” (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8)).
420
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